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Abstract
This paper attempts to provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the mea-
surement of economic tail risk, which is not only closely related to utility theory
but also relevant to statistical model uncertainty. The main result is that the
only risk measures that satisfy a set of economic axioms for the Choquet ex-
pected utility and the statistical property of elicitability (i.e. there exists an
objective function such that minimizing the expected objective function yields
the risk measure) are the mean functional and the median shortfall, which is the
median of tail loss distribution. Elicitability is important for backtesting. We
also extend the result to address model uncertainty by incorporating multiple
scenarios. As an application, we argue that median shortfall is a better alter-
native than expected shortfall for setting capital requirements in Basel Accords.
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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the measurement
of economic tail risk. Two important applications are setting insurance premiums
and capital requirements for financial institutions. For example, a widely used class
of risk measures for setting insurance risk premiums is proposed by Wang, Young and
Panjer (1997) based on a set of axioms. In terms of capital requirements, Gordy (2003)
provides a theoretical foundation for the Basel Accord banking book risk measure,
by demonstrating that under certain conditions the risk measure is asymptotically
equivalent to the 99.9% Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a widely used approach for the
measurement of tail risk; see, e.g., Duffie and Pan (1997, 2001) and Jorion (2007).
In this paper we focus on two aspects of risk measurement. First, risk measurement
is closely related to utility theories of risk preferences. The papers that are most
relevant to the present paper are Schmeidler (1986, 1989), which extend the expected
utility theory by relaxing the independence axiom to the comonotonic independence
axiom; this class of risk preference can successfully explain various violations of the
expectated utility theory, such as the Ellsberg paradox. Second, a major difficulty in
measuring tail risk is that the tail part of a loss distribution is difficult to estimate
and hence bears substantial model uncertainty. As emphasized by Hansen (2013),
“uncertainty can come from limited data, unknown models and misspecification of
those models.”
In face of statistical uncertainty, different procedures may be used to forecast the
risk measure. It is hence desirable to be able to evaluate which procedure gives a
better forecast. The elicitability of a risk measure is a property based on a decision-
theoretic framework for evaluating the performance of different forecasting procedures
(Gneiting (2011)). The elicitability of a risk measure means that the risk measure can
be obtained by minimizing the expectation of a forecasting objective function (i.e.,
a scoring rule, see Winkler and Jose (2011)); then, the forecasting objective function
can be used for evaluating different forecasting procedures.
Elicitability is closely related to backtesting, whose objective is to evaluate the
performance of a risk forecasting model. If a risk measure is elicitable, then the sample
average forecasting error based on the objective function can be used for backtesting
the risk measure. Gneiting (2011) shows that VaR is elicitable but expected shortfall is
not, which “may challenge the use of the expected shortfall as a predictive measure of
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risk, and may provide a partial explanation for the lack of literature on the evaluation
of expected shortfall forecasts, as opposed to quantile or VaR forecasts.” Gaglianone,
Lima, Linton and Smith (2011) propose a backtest for evaluating VaR estimates that
delivers more power in finite samples than existing methods and develop a mechanism
to find out why and when a model is misspecified; see also Jorion (2007, Ch. 6).
Linton and Xiao (2013) point out that VaR has an advantage over expected shortfall
as the asymptotic inference procedures for VaR “has the same asymptotic behavior
regardless of the thickness of the tails.”
The elicitability of a risk measure is also related to the concept of “consistency” of
a risk measure proposed by Davis (2013), who shows that VaR exhibits some inherent
superiority over other risk measures.
The main result of the paper is that the only risk measures that satisfy both a set
of economic axioms proposed by Schmeidler (1989) and the statistical requirement of
elicitability (Gneiting (2011)) are the mean functional and the median shortfall, which
is the median of the tail loss distribution and is also the VaR at a higher confidence
level.
A risk measure is said to be robust if (i) it can accommodate model misspecification
(possibly by incorporating multiple scenarios and models) and (ii) it has statistical
robustness, which means that a small deviation in the model or small changes in
the data only results in a small change in the risk measurement. The first part of
the meaning of robustness is related to ambiguity and model uncertainty in decision
theory. To address these issues, multiple priors or multiple models may be used;
see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006), and
Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2007), among others. We also incorporate multiple models
in this paper; see Section 3. We add to the this literature by studying the link
between risk measures and statistical uncertainty via elicitability. As for the second
part of the meaning of robustness, Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010) show that
expected shortfall leads to a less robust risk measurement procedure than historical
VaR; Kou, Peng and Heyde (2006, 2013) propose a set of axioms for robust external
risk measures, which include VaR.
There has been a growing literature on capital requirements for banking regulation
and robust risk measurement. Glasserman and Kang (2013) investigate the design of
risk weights to align regulatory and private objectives in a mean-variance framework
for portfolio selection. Glasserman and Xu (2014) develop a framework for quantifying
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the impact of model error and for measuring and minimizing risk in a way that
is robust to model error. Keppo, Kofman and Meng (2010) show that the Basel
II market risk requirements may have the unintended consequence of postponing
banks’ recapitalization and hence increasing banks’ default probability. We add to
this literature by applying our theoretical results to the study on which risk measure
may be more suitable for setting capital requirements in Basel Accords; see Section
4.
Important contribution to measurement of risk based on economic axioms in-
cludes Aumann and Serrano (2008), Foster and Hart (2009, 2013), and Hart (2011),
which study risk measurement of gambles (i.e., random variables with positive mean
and taking negative values with positive probability). This paper complements their
results by linking economic axioms for risk measurement with statistical model uncer-
tainty; in addition, our approach focuses on the measurement of tail risk for general
random variables. Thus, the risk measure considered in this paper has a different
objective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main
result of the paper. In Section 3, we propose to use a scenario aggregation function to
combine risk measurements under multiple models. In Section 4, we apply the results
in previous sections to the study of Basel Accord capital requirements. Section 5 is
devoted to relevant comments.
2 Main Results
2.1 Axioms and Representation
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space that describes the states and the probability of
occurrence of states at a future time T . Assume the probability space is large enough
so that one can define a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let a random
variable X defined on the probability space denote the random loss of a portfolio of
financial assets that will be realized at time T . Then −X is the random profit of
the portfolio. Let X be a set of random variables that include all bounded random
variables, i.e., X ⊃ L∞(Ω,F , P ), where L∞(Ω,F , P ) := {X | there exists M <
∞ such that |X| ≤ M, a.s. P}. A risk measure ρ is a functional defined on X that
maps a random variable X to a real number ρ(X). The specification of X depends
on ρ; in particular, X can include unbounded random variables. For example, if ρ is
4
variance, then X can be specified as L2(Ω,F , P ); if ρ is VaR, then X can be specified
as the set of all random variables.
An important relation between two random variables is comonotonicity (Schmei-
dler (1986)): Two random variables X and Y are said to be comonotonic, if (X(ω1)−
X(ω2))(Y (ω1)− Y (ω2)) ≥ 0, ∀ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω. Let X and Y be the loss of two portfolios,
respectively. Suppose that there is a representative agent in the economy and he or
she prefers the profit −X to the profit −Y . If the agent is risk averse, then his or her
preference may imply that −X is less risky than −Y . Motivated by this, we propose
the following set of axioms, which are based on the axioms for the Choquet expected
utility (Schmeidler (1989)), for the risk measure ρ.
Axiom A1. Comonotonic independence: for all pairwise comonotonic random vari-
ables X, Y, Z and for all α ∈ (0, 1), ρ(X) < ρ(Y ) implies that ρ(αX + (1 − α)Z) <
ρ(αY + (1− α)Z).
Axiom A2. Monotonicity: ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ), if X ≤ Y .
Axiom A3. Standardization: ρ(x ·1Ω) = sx, for all x ∈ R, where s > 0 is a constant.
Axiom A4. Law invariance: ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) if X and Y have the same distribution.
Axiom A5. Continuity: limM→∞ ρ(min(max(X,−M),M)) = ρ(X), ∀X .
Axiom A1 corresponds to the comonotonic independence axiom for the Choquet
expected utility risk preferences (Schmeidler (1989)). Axiom A2 is a minimum re-
quirement for a reasonable risk measure. Axiom A3 with s = 1 is used in Schmeidler
(1986); the constant s in Axiom A3 can be related to the “countercyclical indexing”
risk measures proposed in Gordy and Howells (2006), where a time-varying multiplier
s that increases during booms and decreases during recessions is used to dampen the
procyclicality of capital requirements; see also Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin (2009), and Adrian and Shin
(2014). Axiom A4 is standard for a law invariant risk measure. Axiom A5 states
that the risk measurement of an unbounded random variable can be approximated
by that of bounded random variables.
A function h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is called a distortion function if h(0) = 0, h(1) = 1,
and h is increasing; h need not be left or right continuous. As a direct application
of the results in Schmeidler (1986), we obtain the following representation of a risk
measure that satisfies Axioms A1-A5.
Lemma 2.1. Let X ⊃ L∞(Ω,F , P ) be a set of random variables (X may include
unbounded random variables). A risk measure ρ : X → R satisfies Axioms A1-A5 if
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and only if there exists a distortion function h(·) such that
ρ(X) = s
∫
X d(h ◦ P ) (1)
= s
∫ 0
−∞
(h(P (X > x))− 1)dx+ s
∫ ∞
0
h(P (X > x))dx, ∀X ∈ X , (2)
where the integral in (1) is the Choquet integral of X with respect to the distorted
non-additive probability h ◦ P (A) := h(P (A)), ∀A ∈ F .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1 extends the representation theorem in Wang, Young and Panjer (1997)
as the requirement of limd→0 ρ((X − d)+) = ρ(X+) in their continuity axiom is not
needed here.1 Note that in the case of random variables, the corollary in Schmeidler
(1986) requires the random variables to be bounded, but Lemma 2.1 does not; Axiom
A5 is automatically satisfied for bounded random variables.
It is clear from (2) that any risk measure satisfying Axioms A1-A5 is monotonic
with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.2 Many commonly used risk measures
are special cases of risk measures defined in (2).
Example 2.1. Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is a quantile of the loss distribution at some
pre-defined probability level. More precisely, let X be the random loss with general
1 The axioms used in Wang, Young and Panjer (1997), including a comonotonic additivity axiom,
imply Axioms A1-A5. More precisely, let Q and Q+ denote the set of rational numbers and positive
rational numbers, respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose s = 1 in Axiom A3. (i) Their
comonotonic additivity axiom implies that ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for any X and λ ∈ Q+, which in
combination with their standardization axiom ρ(1) = 1 implies ρ(λ) = λρ(1) = λ, λ ∈ Q+. Since
ρ(−λ)+ρ(λ) = ρ(0) = 0, it follows that ρ(λ) = λ, ∀λ ∈ Q. Then for any λ ∈ R, there exists {xn} ⊂ Q
and {yn} ⊂ Q such that xn ↓ λ and yn ↑ λ. By the monotonic axiom, xn = ρ(xn) ≥ ρ(λ) ≥ ρ(yn) =
yn. Letting n → ∞ yields ρ(λ) = λ, ∀λ ∈ R; hence, Axiom A3 holds. (ii) By the monotonic
axiom, ρ(min(X,M)) ≤ ρ(min(max(X,−M),M)) ≤ ρ(max(X,−M)). Letting M → ∞ and using
the conditions ρ(min(X,M)) → ρ(X) and ρ(max(X,−M))→ ρ(X) as M → ∞ in their continuity
axiom, without need of the condition limd→0 ρ((X − d)+) = ρ(X+), Axiom A5 follows. (iii) We then
show positive homogeneity holds, i.e. ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for any X and any λ > 0. For any X and
M > 0, denote XM := min(max(X,−M),M). For any ǫ > 0 and λ > 0, there exist {λn} ⊂ Q+ such
that λn → λ as n→∞ and λnρ(XM )−ǫ = ρ(λnXM−ǫ) ≤ ρ(λXM ) ≤ ρ(λnXM+ǫ) = λnρ(XM )+ǫ.
Letting n → ∞ yields λρ(XM ) − ǫ ≤ ρ(λXM ) ≤ λρ(XM ) + ǫ, ∀ǫ > 0. Letting ǫ ↓ 0 leads to
ρ(λXM ) = λρ(XM ), ∀λ ≥ 0. Letting M → ∞ and applying Axiom A5 result in ρ(λX) = λρ(X),
∀λ ≥ 0. Their comonotonic additivity axiom and positive homogeneity imply Axiom A1.
2For two random variables X and Y , if X first-order stochastically dominates Y , then P (X >
x) ≥ P (Y > x) for all x, which implies that for a risk measure ρ represented by (2), ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
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distribution function FX(·), which may not be continuous or strictly increasing. For
a given α ∈ (0, 1], VaR of X at level α is defined as
VaRα(X) := F
−1
X (α) = inf{x | FX(x) ≥ α}.
For α = 0, VaR of X at level α is defined to be VaR0(X) := inf{x | FX(x) > 0}
and VaR0(X) is equal to the essential infimum of X. For α ∈ (0, 1], ρ in (2) is equal
to VaRα if h(x) := 1{x>1−α}; ρ in (2) is equal to VaR0 if h(x) := 1{x=1}. VaR is
monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
Example 2.2. Expected shortfall (ES). For α ∈ [0, 1), ES of X at level α is defined
as the mean of the α-tail distribution of X (Tasche (2002), Rockafellar and Uryasev
(2002)), i.e.,
ESα(X) := mean of the α-tail distribution of X =
∫ ∞
−∞
xdFα,X(x), α ∈ [0, 1),
where Fα,X(x) is the α-tail distribution defined as (Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002)):
Fα,X(x) :=
{
0, for x < VaRα(X)
FX(x)−α
1−α
, for x ≥ VaRα(X).
For α = 1, ES of X at level α is defined as ES1(X) := F
−1
X (1). If the loss distribution
FX is continuous, then Fα,X is the same as the conditional distribution of X given
that X ≥ VaRα(X); if FX is not continuous, then Fα,X(x) is a slight modification of
the conditional loss distribution. For α ∈ [0, 1), ρ(X) in (2) is equal to ESα(X) if
h(x) =
{
x
1−α
, x ≤ 1− α,
1, x > 1− α.
For α = 1, ρ(X) in (2) is equal to ES1(X) if h(x) = 1{x>0}.
Example 2.3. Median shortfall (MS). As we will see later, expected shortfall has
several statistical drawbacks including non-elicitability and non-robustness. To miti-
gate the problems, one may simply use median shortfall. In contrast to ES which is
the mean of the tail loss distribution, MS is the median of the same tail loss distribu-
tion. More precisely, MS of X at level α ∈ [0, 1) is defined as (Kou, Peng and Heyde
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(2013))3
MSα(X) := median of the α-tail distribution of X = F
−1
α,X(
1
2
) = inf{x | Fα,X(x) ≥
1
2
}.
For α = 1, MS at level α is defined as MS1(X) := F
−1
X (1). Therefore, MS at level α
can capture the tail risk and considers both the size and likelihood of losses beyond
the VaR at level α, because it measures the median of the loss size conditional on that
the loss exceeds the VaR at level α. It can be shown that4
MSα(X) = VaR 1+α
2
(X), ∀X, ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, ρ(X) in (2) is equal to MSα(X) if h(x) := 1{x>(1−α)/2}.
Since MSα = VaR(1+α)/2, MSα does not quantify the risk beyond VaR(1+α)/2. How-
ever, it is also difficult to know the precise degree to which ESα quantifies the risk
beyond VaR(1+α)/2; in fact, just as MSα, ESα can also fail to reveal large loss beyond
VaR(1+α)/2. For example, fix c := VaRα and consider a sequence of α-tail distribu-
tions Fα,n that are mixtures of translated exponential distributions and point mass
distributions, which are defined by
Fα,n(x) :=
{
0, for x < c,
(1− β(n))(1− e−λ(x−c)) + β(n)1{n≤x}, β(n) :=
µ
n−c− 1
λ
, for x ≥ c,
(3)
where λ, µ > 0 are constants. In other words, Fα,n is the mixture of c+ exp(λ) (with
probability (1 − β(n))) and the point mass δn (with probability β(n)). Under Fα,n, a
large loss with size n occurs with a small probability β(n). For each n, ESα,n, which
is the mean of Fα,n, is always equal to c + µ +
1
λ
; hence, ESα fails in the same way
as MSα regarding the detection of the large loss with size n which may occur beyond
VaR(1+α)/2. This example shows that the degree to which ESα quantifies the risk
beyond VaR(1+α)/2 might also be limited. After all, MSα and ESα are respectively the
median and the mean of the same α-tail loss distribution. The information contained
in the mean of a distribution might not be more than that contained in the median of
the same distribution, and vice versa.
3The term “median shortfall” is also used in Moscadelli (2004) and So and Wong (2012) but is
respectively defined as median[X |X > u] for a constant u and median[X |X > VaRα(X)], which
are different from that defined in Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013). In fact, the definition in the
aforementioned second paper is the same as the “tail conditional median” proposed in Kou, Peng
and Heyde (2006).
4Indeed, for α ∈ (0, 1), by definition, MSα(X) = inf{x | Fα,X(x) ≥
1
2} = inf{x |
FX (x)−α
1−α ≥
1
2} =
inf{x | FX(x) ≥
1+α
2 } = VaR 1+α2
(X); for α = 1, by definition, MS1(X) = F
−1
X (1) = VaR1(X); for
α = 0, by definition, F0,X = FX and hence MS0(X) = F
−1
X (
1
2 ) = VaR 12 (X).
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Example 2.4. Generalized spectral risk measures. A generalized spectral risk measure
is defined by
ρ∆(X) :=
∫
(0,1]
F−1X (u)d∆(u), (4)
where ∆ is a probability measure on (0, 1]. The class of risk measures represented by
(2) include and are strictly larger than the class of generalized spectral risk measures,
as they all satisfy Axioms A1-A5.5 A special case of (4) is the spectral risk measure
(Acerbi (2002), Definition 3.1), defined as
ρ(X) =
∫
(0,1)
F−1X (u)φ(u)du, φ(·) is increasing, nonnegative, and
∫ 1
0
φ(u)du = 1.
(5)
Because of the requirement that φ is increasing, the class of spectral risk measure is
much smaller than the class of generalized spectral risk measure defined in (4). The
distinction between the spectral risk measure and that in (4) is that the former is
convex but the latter may not be convex. The convexity requires that the function φ in
(5) is an increasing function. The MINMAXVAR risk measure proposed in Cherny
and Madan (2009) for the measurement of trading performance is a special case of the
spectral risk measure, corresponding to a distortion function h(x) = 1− (1−x
1
1+α )1+α
in (2), where α ≥ 0 is a constant.
The class of risk measures satisfying Axioms A1-A5 and the class of law-invariant
coherent (convex) risk measures have non-empty intersections but no one is the subset
of the other. For example, expected shortfall belongs to both classes; VaR belongs
to the former but not the latter. The class of risk measures satisfying Axioms A1-
A5 include the class of law-invariant spectral risk measures as a strict subset. For
example, VaR belongs to the former but not the latter. The class of risk measures
5In fact, for any fixed u ∈ (0, 1], F−1X (u) = VaRu(X) as a functional on L
∞(Ω,F , P ) is a
special case of the risk measure (2). By the proof of Lemma 2.1, VaRu satisfies monotonicity,
positive homogeneity, and comonotonic additivity, which implies that ρ∆ satisfies Axioms A1-A4
for any ∆. On L∞(Ω,F , P ), ρ∆ automatically satisfies Axiom A5. On the other hand, for an
α ∈ (0, 1), the right quantile q+α (X) := inf{x | FX(x) > α} is a special case of the risk measure
defined in (2) with h(x) being defined as h(x) := 1{x≥1−α}, but it can be shown that q
+
α cannot
be represented by (4). Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a ∆ such
that q+α (X) = ρ∆(X), ∀X ∈ L
∞(Ω,F , P ). Let X0 have a strictly positive density on its support.
Then, F−1X0 (u) is continuous and strictly increases on (0, 1]. Let c > 0 be a constant. Define
X1 = X0 · 1{X0≤F−1X0 (α)}
+ (X0 + c) · 1{X0>F−1X0 (α)}
. It follows from q+α (X1) − q
+
α (X0) = ρ∆(X1) −
ρ∆(X0) that ∆((α, 1]) = 1, which in combination with the strict monotonicity of F
−1
X0
(u) implies
that ρ∆(X0) =
∫
(α,1] F
−1
X0
(u)∆(du) > F−1X0 (α) = q
+
α (X0). This contradicts to ρ∆(X0) = q
+
α (X0).
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satisfying Axioms A1-A5 is the same as the class of “distortion risk measure” proposed
in Wang, Young and Panjer (1997). The “distortion risk measures” sometimes refer
to the class of risk measures defined in (4). As we point out in Example 2.4, the class
of risk measures defined in (4) is a strict subset of the class of risk measures satisfying
Axioms A1-A5.
If a risk measure ρ satisfies Axiom A4 (law invariance), then ρ(X) only depends
on FX ; hence, ρ induces a statistical functional that maps a distribution FX to a
real number ρ(X). For simplicity of notation, we still denote the induced statistical
functional as ρ. Namely, we will use ρ(X) and ρ(FX) interchangeably in the sequel.
2.2 Elicitability
The measurement of risk of X using ρ may be viewed as a point forecasting problem,
because the risk measurement ρ(X) (or ρ(FX)) summarizes the distribution FX by a
real number ρ(X), just as a point forecast forX does. In practice, the true distribution
FX is unknown and one has to find an estimate FˆX for forecasting the unknown true
value ρ(FX). As one may come up with different procedures to forecast ρ(FX), it is
an important issue to evaluate which procedure provides a better forecast of ρ(FX).
The theory of elicitability provides a decision-theoretic foundation for effective
evaluation of point forecasting procedures. Suppose one wants to forecast the realiza-
tion of a random variable Y using a point x, without knowing the true distribution
FY . The expected forecasting error is given by
ES(x, Y ) =
∫
S(x, y)dFY (y),
where S(x, y) : R2 → R is a forecasting objective function, e.g., S(x, y) = (x− y)2 or
S(x, y) = |x− y|. The optimal point forecast corresponding to S is
ρ∗(FY ) = argmin
x
ES(x, Y ).
For example, when S(x, y) = (x − y)2 and S(x, y) = |x − y|, the optimal forecast is
the mean functional ρ∗(FY ) = E(Y ) and the median functional ρ
∗(FY ) = F
−1
Y (
1
2
),
respectively.
A statistical functional ρ is elicitable if there exists a forecasting objective function
S such that minimizing the expected forecasting error yields ρ. Many statistical func-
tionals are elicitable. For example, the median functional is elicitable, as minimizing
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the expected forecasting error with S(x, y) = |x−y| yields the median functional. If ρ
is elicitable, then one can evaluate two point forecasting methods by comparing their
respective expected forecasting error ES(x, Y ). As FY is unknown, the expected fore-
casting error can be approximated by the average 1
n
∑n
i=1 S(xi, Yi), where Y1, . . . , Yn
are samples that have the distribution FY and x1, . . . , xn are the corresponding point
forecasts.
If a statistical functional ρ is not elicitable, then for any objective function S, the
minimization of the expected forecasting error does not yield the true value ρ(F ).
Hence, one cannot tell which one of competing point forecasts for ρ(F ) performs the
best by comparing their forecasting errors, no matter what objective function S is
used.
The concept of elicitability dates back to the pioneering work of Savage (1971),
Thomson (1979), and Osband (1985) and is further developed by Lambert, Pennock
and Shoham (2008) and Gneiting (2011), who contends that “in issuing and evaluat-
ing point forecasts, it is essential that either the objective function (i.e., the function
S) be specified ex ante, or an elicitable target functional be named, such as an ex-
pectation or a quantile, and objective functions be used that are consistent for the
target functional.” Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) also points out the crit-
ical importance of the specification of an objective function or an elicitable target
functional.
In the present paper, we are concerned with the measurement of risk, which is
given by a single-valued statistical functional. Following Definition 2 in Gneiting
(2011), where the elicitability for a set-valued statistical functional is defined, we
define the elicitability for a single-valued statistical functional as follows.6
Definition 2.1. A single-valued statistical functional ρ(·) is elicitable with respect to
a class of distributions P if there exists a forecasting objective function S : R2 → R
such that
ρ(F ) = min
{
x | x ∈ argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF (y)
}
, ∀F ∈ P. (6)
In the definition, we only require that S satisfies the condition that
∫
S(x, y)dF (y)
is well-defined and finite for any F ∈ P. We do not need other conditions such as
6In Definition 2.1, the requirement that ρ(F ) is the minimum of the set of minimizers of the
expected objective function is not essential. In fact, if one replaces the first “min” in (6) by “max”,
the conclusions of the paper remain the same; one only needs to change “VaRα” to the right quantile
q+α in Theorem 2.1.
11
continuity or smoothness on S.
2.3 Main Result
The following Theorem 2.1 shows that the median shortfall and the mean functional
are the only risk measures that (i) are elicitable; and (ii) have the decision-theoretic
foundation of Choquet expected utility (i.e., satisfying Axioms A1-A5). Median short-
fall at level α provides a precise description of the average size of loss beyond VaRα by
median; whereas the mean functional captures the tail risk in the sense that knowing
E(L) leads to an upper bound 1
x
E(L) for the tail probability P (L > x) if L ≥ 0.7
Theorem 2.1. Let ρ : X → R be a risk measure that satisfies Axioms A1-A5 and
X ⊃ L∞(Ω,F , P ). Let P := {FX | X ∈ X}. Then, ρ(·) (viewed as a statistical
functional on P) is elicitable with respect to P if and only if one of the following two
cases holds:
(i) ρ = VaRα for some α ∈ (0, 1] (noting that MSα = VaRα+1
2
for α ∈ [0, 1]). Here
VaRα is a single valued functional as defined in Section 2.1.
(ii) ρ(F ) =
∫
xdF (x), ∀F .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The major difficulty of the proof lies in that the distortion function h(·) in the rep-
resentation equation (2) of risk measures satisfying Axioms A1-A5 can have various
kinds of discontinuities on [0, 1]; in particular, the proof is not based on any assump-
tion on left or right continuity of h(·). The outline of the proof is as follows. First, we
show that a necessary condition for ρ to be elicitable is that ρ has convex level sets,
i.e., ρ(F1) = ρ(F2) implies that ρ(F1) = ρ(λF1 + (1− λ)F2), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1). The second
and the key step is to show that only four kinds of risk measures have convex level
sets: (i) cVaR0 + (1− c)VaR1 for some constant c ∈ [0, 1]; (ii) VaRα, α ∈ (0, 1), and,
in particular, MSα, α ∈ [0, 1); (iii) ρ = cq−α +(1− c)q
+
α , where α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1)
are constants, q−α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) ≥ α}, and q
+
α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) > α}; (iv)
the mean functional. Lastly, we examine the elicitability of the aforementioned four
kinds of risk measures; in particular, we show that ρ = cq−α + (1 − c)q
+
α for c ∈ [0, 1)
is not elicitable by extending the main proposition in Thomson (1979).
7We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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2.4 Co-elicitability
The co-elicitability of k ≥ 2 statistical functionals is a weaker notion of elicitability
than the notion of elicitability of one statistical functional defined in Definition 2.1.
The notion of co-elicitability is formulated in Lambert et al. (2008, Definition 9),
which we slightly generalize and rephrase in our notation as follows:8
Definition 2.2. k ≥ 2 single-valued statistical functionals ρ1(·), . . . , ρk(·) are called
co-elicitable with respect to a class of distributions P if there exists a forecasting
objective function S : Rk+1 → R such that
(ρ1(F ), . . . , ρk(F ))
=min
{
(x1, . . . , xk) | (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ arg min
(x1,...,xk)
∫
S(x1, . . . , xk, y)dF (y)
}
, ∀F ∈ P.
(8)
The notion of co-elicitability is weaker than that of elicitability because: (i) if for
each i = 1, . . . , k, ρi is elicitable with a corresponding forecasting objective function
Si(·, ·), then (ρ1, . . . , ρk) are co-elicitable with the corresponding function S being
defined as S(x1, . . . , xk, y) :=
∑k
i=1 Si(xi, y); (ii) if (ρ1, . . . , ρk) are co-elicitable, it
does not imply that each ρi is elicitable.
Acerbi and Sze´kely (2014) show that (VaRα,ESα) are co-elicitable with respect to a
class of distributions P which satisfy some restrictive conditions based on an intuitive
argument; Fissler and Ziegel (2015) show that (VaRα,ESα) are co-elicitable with re-
spective to P = {F | F has a continuous density on R and F has unique α quantile for
all α ∈ (0, 1)}, and the corresponding forecasting objective function S in Definition
2.2 may be specified as
S(x1, x2, y) =(1{x1≥y} − α)(−G1(−x1) +G1(−y))+
1
1− α
G2(−x2)1{x1<y}(y − x1) +G2(−x2)(x1 − x2)− G2(−x2), (9)
where G1 and G2 are strictly increasing continuously differentiable functions, G1 is
F -integrable for any F ∈ P, limx→−∞G2(x) = 0, and G ′2 = G2, e.g., G1(x) = x and
G2(x) = e
x.
8Without generalization, Definition 9 in Lambert et al. (2008) can be rephrased by replacing (8)
by:
(ρ1(F ), . . . , ρk(F )) = arg min
(x1,...,xk)
∫
S(x1, . . . , xk, y)dF (y), ∀F ∈ P . (7)
Hence, the only generalization lies in adding min{· · · } to incorporate the case that there are more
than one minimizers to the optimization problem in (8).
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The co-elicitability of (VaRα,ESα) implies that one can evaluate the performance
of different forecasting procedures that forecast the collection of (VaRα,ESα) by com-
paring their realized forecasting errors. More precisely, procedure 1 is considered to
better forecast the collection of (VaRα,ESα) than procedure 2 if
1
T
T∑
t=1
S(var1t , es
1
t , Yt) <
1
T
T∑
t=1
S(var2t , es
2
t , Yt), (10)
where (varit, es
i
t) are the forecasts generated by the ith procedure at time t, i = 1, 2,
and Yt is the realized loss at time t, t = 1, . . . , T .
The co-elicitability of (ESα,VaRα) does not lead to a reliable method for eval-
uating forecasts for ESα. More precisely, even if procedure 1 better forecasts the
collection (VaRα,ESα) than procedure 2 in the sense of (10), procedure 1 may pro-
vide much worse forecast of ESα than procedure 2; this is illustrated in Example 2.5
and Example 2.6 at the end of Section 2.5.2.
Theorem 2.1 identifies all elicitable risk measures within the class of risk measures
that satisfy Axioms A1-A5; a counterpart of the problem studied in Theorem 2.1 is the
following one: For k ≥ 2, can we identify all the k-tuple of risk measures (ρ1, . . . , ρk)
such that (ρ1, . . . , ρk) are co-elicitable and each ρi satisfies Axioms A1-A5? Because
co-elicitability is weaker than elicitability, the above problem is different from that
studied in Theorem 2.1; the answer to the problem does not imply Theorem 2.1, and
Theorem 2.1 does not provide a complete answer to the problem.
Some examples of risk measures that satisfy the conditions in the above open
problem are provided in Fissler and Ziegel (2015). In addition to (VaRα,ESα),
(VaRα1 , . . . ,VaRαk ,
∑k
i=1wiESαi) are shown to be co-elicitable, where 0 < α1 < · · · <
αk < 1, (w1, . . . , wk) are any weights satisfying
∑k
i=1wi = 1 and wi > 0, i = 1, . . . , k.
However, the complete answer to the open problem is not known yet; we leave it for
future research.
2.5 Backtesting a Risk Measure
As will be shown in the following subsections, there are three approaches for back-
testing a risk measure: (i) the direst backtest, which tests if the point estimate or
point forecast of the risk measurement under a model is equal to the unknown true
risk measurement; (ii) the indirect backtest, which can be classified into two kinds:
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(a) the first kind of indirect backtests examine if the entire loss distribution, the en-
tire tail loss distribution, or a collection of statistics including the risk measure of
interest under a model are equal to the corresponding quantities under the true un-
derlying unknown model; (b) the second kind of indirect backtests are based on the
co-elicitability of a collection of risk measures; (iii) the forecast evaluation approach
based on the elicitability of the risk measure.
We will also show in the subsections that: (i) VaR and median shortfall can
be backtested by all three approaches. (ii) There have been no direct backtesting
methods for expected shortfall. (iii) Indirect backtesting methods for expected short-
fall have been proposed in the literature. The first kind of indirect backtesting for
expected shortfall is a partial backtesting in the sense that: (a) if an indirect back-
testing for expected shortfall is not rejected, it will imply that the point forecast for
expected shortfall will not be rejected; (b) however, if an indirect backtesting for
expected shortfall is rejected, it will be unclear whether the point forecast for ex-
pected shortfall should be rejected. The second kind of indirect backtests which are
based on the co-elicitability of (VaRα,ESα) cannot answer the question whether the
ESα forecasted under a bank’s model is more accurate that that forecasted under a
benchmark model.
2.5.1 The Direct Backtesting Approach
The direct backtesting approach is to test whether the risk measurement calculated
under a model is equal to the unknown true value of risk measurement. It concerns
whether the point estimate or point forecast of the risk measure is acceptable or not.
For example, suppose a bank reports that the VaR99% of its trading book is 1 billion.
The direct backtesting approach answers the question whether the single number 1
billion is acceptable or not.
More precisely, suppose the loss of a bank on the tth day is Lt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
On each day t − 1, the bank forecasts the risk measurement ρ of Lt based on the
information available on day t − 1, which is denoted as Ft−1. Let Gt|t−1 denote
the bank’s model of the conditional distribution of Lt given Ft−1, and let ρ
Gt|t−1(Lt)
denote the risk measurement of Lt under the model Gt|t−1. Suppose the unknown
true conditional distribution of Lt given Ft−1 is Ft|t−1 and the true risk measurement
is denoted as ρFt|t−1(Lt). Then, the direst backtesting of the risk measure ρ is to test
H0 : ρ
Gt|t−1(Lt) = ρ
Ft|t−1(Lt), ∀t = 1, . . . , T ; H1 : otherwise. (11)
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For ρ = VaRα, the null hypothesis in (11) is equivalent to that It := 1{Lt>VaRα(Lt)}, t =
1, . . . , T , are i.i.d. Bernoulli(1 − α) random variables (Christoffersen (1998), Lemma
1). Based on such observation, Kupiec (1995) propose the proportion of failure test for
backtesting VaR, which is closely related to the “traffic light” approach of backtesting
VaR adopted in the Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; 1996,
2006). Christoffersen (1998) propose conditional coverage and independence tests for
VaR within a first-order Markov process model. For more recent development on the
backtesting of VaR, see Lopez (1999a), Lopez (1999b), Engle and Manganelli (2004),
Christoffersen and Pelletier (2004), Haas (2005), Campbell (2006), Christoffersen
(2010), Berkowitz, Christoffersen and Pelletier (2011), Gaglianone, Lima, Linton and
Smith (2011), etc.
As MSα = VaR(1+α)/2, the backtesting of median shortfall is exactly the same as
that of VaR. In contrast, there have been no direct backtesting methods for expected
shortfall in the existing literature. The reason might be simple: The null hypothesis
for direct backtesting expected shortfall is that ES
Gt|t−1
α (Lt) = ES
Ft|t−1
α (Lt). It might
be difficult (if not impossible) to find a statistic whose distribution is known under
the null hypothesis. In contrast, the distribution of the indicator random variable
It = 1{Lt>VaRα(Lt)} is known under the null hypothesis for direct backtesting VaR,
and hence It can be used to construct test statistic for direct backtesting VaR.
2.5.2 The Indirect Backtesting Approach
There are two kinds of indirect backtesting approaches. The first kind of indirect
backtesting approach concerns whether the bank’s model of the entire loss distribu-
tion is the same as the unknown true loss distribution. More precisely, the indirect
backtesting approach is to test:
H0 : Gt|t−1(x) = Ft|t−1(x), ∀x ∈ R, ∀t = 1, . . . , T ; H1 : otherwise. (12)
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then it will imply that ρGt|t−1(Lt) = ρ
Ft|t−1(Lt),
i.e., the risk measurement will not be rejected; however, if the null hypothesis is
rejected, then it will be unclear whether the point forecast ρGt|t−1(Lt) should be
rejected or not. Therefore, the kind of indirect backtesting approach can only serve
as a partial backtesting of a particular risk measure. For example, suppose a bank
reports that the ES99% of its trading book is 1 billion. Using the indirect backtesting
approach, one can test the bank’s model of the entire loss distribution. If the test is
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not rejected, then it will imply that the number 1 billion is acceptable; however, if
the test is rejected, then it will be unclear if the number 1 billion should be accepted
or rejected.
Strictly speaking, this indirect backtesting approach shall not be regarded as an
approach for backtesting a particular risk measure, because the backtesting has noth-
ing to do with any particular risk measure, although the test has partial implication
on the acceptability of the point forecast of a particular risk measure.
This kind of indirect backtesting approaches have been proposed for backtesting
expected shortfall in the literature. Berkowitz (2001) propose likelihood ratio tests
based on censored Gaussian likelihood for the test (12). Kerkhof and Melenberg
(2004) propose a functional delta method for testing the hypothesis (12). Acerbi and
Sze´kely (2014) propose three indirect tests for backtesting ESα. The first two tests are
to test the entire tail loss distribution under the assumption that VaRα has already
been tested and that L1, . . . , LT are independent:
H0 : Gt|t−1,α(x) = Ft|t−1,α(x), ∀x ∈ R, ∀t = 1, . . . , T ; H1 : otherwise, (13)
where Gt|t−1,α and Ft|t−1,,α and the α-tail distribution of Gt|t−1 and Ft|t−1 respectively
(see Example 2.2 for definition of α-tail distribution). The third test is the same as
the test (12). All the three tests proposed by the authors require that one knows
how to simulate random samples with distribution Gt|t−1(·) in order to simulate the
test statistic and to calculate the p value of the test. Costanzino and Curran (2015)
propose an approach to indirectly backtest ESα by testing:
H0 :
∫ 1
α
1{Lt≤VaRp(Lt)}dp, t = 1, . . . , T, are i.i.d., VaR
Ft|t−1
p (Lt) = VaR
Gt|t−1
p (Lt),
∀p ∈ [α, 1), t = 1, . . . , T
H1 :otherwise. (14)
This approach does not need to simulate random samples under the null hypothesis
in order to calculate the p value. McNeil and Frey (2000) assume that the loss
process {Lt, t = 1, . . . , T} follows the dynamics Lt = mt + stZt, where mt and st
are respectively the conditional mean and conditional standard deviation, and Zt is
a strict white noise. Under this assumption, they propose to backtest ESα by testing
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the hypothesis:
H0 :m
Gt|t−1
t = mt, s
Gt|t−1
t = st,VaR
Gt|t−1
α (Lt) = VaR
Ft|t−1
α (Lt),
ES
Gt|t−1
α (Lt) = ES
Ft|t−1
α (Lt), ∀t;
H1 :otherwise. (15)
This test is an indirect test for ESα because if the null hypothesis is rejected, it is not
clear if the claim ES
Gt|t−1
α (Lt) = ES
Ft|t−1
α (Lt), ∀t should be rejected or not.
The second kind of indirect backtests are those based on the co-elicitability of a
collection of risk measures. For example, let (VaRBenα (Lt),ES
Ben
α (Lt)), t = 1, . . . , T},
be the (VaRα,ESα) forecasted under a benchmark model such as a standard model
specified by the regulator. Fissler et al. (2015) propose the following two indirect
backtests for backtesting ESα:
H−0 :Et−1[S(VaR
Gt|t−1
α (Lt),ES
Gt|t−1
α (Lt), Lt)] ≥ Et−1[S(VaR
Ben
α (Lt),ES
Ben
α (Lt), Lt)], ∀t
H−1 :otherwise;
H+0 :Et−1[S(VaR
Gt|t−1
α (Lt),ES
Gt|t−1
α (Lt), Lt)] ≤ Et−1[S(VaR
Ben
α (Lt),ES
Ben
α (Lt), Lt)], ∀t
H+1 :otherwise, (16)
where S(·, ·, ·) is the forecasting objective function defined in (9) with G1(x) = x and
G2(x) = e
x/(1 + ex).
These tests are indirect backtests for ESα because no matter these tests are re-
jected or not, we do now know whether ES
Gt|t−1
α is more accurate than ES
Ben
α (Lt). In
fact, these tests are not able to find out which model gives a more accurate forecast
for ESα, as is shown in Example 2.5.
Example 2.5. Suppose the true distribution of a bank’s loss random variable L is
N(µ, σ2) with µ = −1.5, σ = 1.0. Let α = 0.975, which is suggested in Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). Then the true value of (VaRα(L),ESα(L))
is (V aRα, ESα) = (0.460, 0.838). Suppose the forecasts given by a bank’s model are
(V aRα, x ·ESα) and those given by a benchmark model (prefered by the regulator) are
(x · V aRα, ESα), where 0 < x < 1; hence, the bank’s model always under-forecasts
ESα but the benchmark model always truthfully forecasts ESα; therefore, the bank’s
model should be rejected. However, these tests will conclude that the bank’s model
are better than the benchmark model because the forecasting error of the bank’s model
(i.e., E[S(V aRα, x·ESα, L)]) is always smaller than that of the benchmark model (i.e.,
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E[S(x · V aRα, ESα, L)]) for any x ∈ (0.55, 1.0). In other words, even if the bank’s
model under-forecasts the ESα by as much as 45%, it will still be wrongly considered
to be better than the benchmark model that truthfully forecasts ESα, mainly due to the
fact that co-elicitability does not imply elicitability, and some rather strange behavior
of the forecasting objective function S defined in (9). This is illustrated by Figure 1.
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Bank’s model: expected forecast error = E[S(VaR, x ⋅ ES, L)]
Benchmark model: expected forecast error = E[S(x ⋅ VaR, ES, L)]
Figure 1: A graph for the counterexample in Example 2.5. The forecasting error of
the bank’s model (i.e., E[S(V aRα, x · ESα, L)]) is always smaller than that of the
benchmark model (i.e., E[S(x · V aRα, ESα, L)]) for any x ∈ (0.55, 1.0); therefore,
the tests in (16) will conclude that the bank’s model better forecasts ESα than the
benchmark model. However, the bank’s model always under-forecasts ESα, while the
benchmark model always truthfully forecasts ESα. Such inconsistency, mainly due to
the fact that co-elicitability does not imply elicitability, shows that the tests in (16)
are not able to find out which model gives a more accurate forecast for ESα.
Another drawback of these backtests is that the performance of the backtests
further deteriorates when the scale of the loss random variable increases, because the
term G2(−x2) in Eq. (9) goes to zero as x2 goes to infinity. The consequence is that
larger banks can more easily under-report ES than smaller banks if such backtests
are used for backtesting ESα. This is illustrated in Example 2.6.
Example 2.6. Suppose there is a larger bank whose loss random variable is 15 times
of the loss L in Example 2.5. Thus, the loss random variable of this larger bank has
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a normal distribution N(µ, σ2) with µ = −1.5 × 15, σ = 15.0. Let α = 0.975. Note
the true value of (VaRα,ESα) is (V aRα, ESα) = (0.460, 0.838) × 15. Suppose the
forecasts given by a bank’s model are (V aRα, x ·ESα) and those given by a benchmark
model (prefered by the regulator) are (x · V aRα, ESα). Again, as in Figure 1, Figure
2 shows that the backtests make the wrong conclusion on which model better forecasts
ESα. In addition, Figure 2 shows that the forecasting error for the bank’s model
almost remain unchanged when x ∈ (0.55, 1.0), which is due to the fact that when
ESα is large enough, the term E[
1
1−α
G2(−x · ESα)1{V aRα<L}(L − V aRα) + G2(−x ·
ESα)(V aRα−xESα)−G2(−x ·ESα)] in the expected forecasting error will be so small
that the expected forecasting error will not change much when x varies. In other
words, when the scale of the loss random variable L is large enough, the expected
forecasting error E[S(V aRα, x · ESα, L)] becomes insensitive to the value of x. This
counterexample happens again mainly due to some strange behavior of the forecasting
objective function S defined in (9).
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Bank’s model: expected forecast error = E[S(VaR, x ⋅ ES, L)]
Benchmark model: expected forecast error = E[S(x ⋅ VaR, ES, L)]
Figure 2: A graph for the counterexample in Example 2.6. The expected forecasting
error of the bank’s model (i.e., E[S(V aRα, x · ESα, L)]) in Example 2.6 almost re-
main unchanged when x ∈ (0.55, 1.0), because when ESα is large enough, the term
E[ 1
1−α
G2(−x·ESα)1{V aRα<L}(L−V aRα)+G2(−x·ESα)(V aRα−xESα)−G2(−x·ESα)]
in the expected forecasting error will be so small that the expected forecasting error
will not change much when x varies. In other words, when the scale of the loss ran-
dom variable L is large enough, the expected forecasting error E[S(V aRα, x ·ESα, L)]
becomes insensitive to the value of x.
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2.5.3 The Backtesting Approach Based on the Elicitability of a Risk Mea-
sure
The backtesting approach based on the forecast evaluation framework and elicitabil-
ity has been proposed to backtest VaR. This approach requires a benchmark model
because the elicitability concerns the comparison of multiple models rather than the
validation of a single model. Lopez (1999a) propose to define the forecasting error
for VaRα under the model Gt|t−1 as
∑T
t=1 S(VaR
Gt|t−1
α (Lt), Lt), where S(·, ·) is a fore-
cast objective function (loss function). Since VaRα is elicitable, S can be defined
as Sα(x, y) = (1{x≥y} − α)(x − y). Then, the forecasting error is compared with a
benchmark forecasting error calculated under a benchmark model to backtest VaRα.
In contrast, expected shortfall cannot be backtested by this approach because it
is not elicitable, and therefore, no function S can be used to define the forecasting
error.
3 Extension to Incorporate Multiple Models
The previous section address the issue of model uncertainty from the perspective of
elicitability. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (2001,
2007), we further incorporate robustness by considering multiple models (scenarios).
More precisely, we consider m probability measures Pi, i = 1, . . . , m on the state
space (Ω,F). Each Pi corresponds to one model or one scenario, which may refer
to a specific economic regime such as an economic boom and a financial crisis. The
loss distribution of a random loss X under different scenarios can be substantially
different. For example, the VaR calculated under the scenario of the 2007 financial
crisis is much higher than that under a scenario corresponding to a normal market
condition due to the difference of loss distributions.
Suppose that under the ith scenario, the measurement of risk is given by ρi that
satisfy Axioms A1-A5. Then by Lemma 2.1, ρi can be represented by ρi(X) =∫
Xd(hi ◦ Pi), where hi is a distortion function, i = 1, . . . , m. We then propose the
following risk measure to incorporate multiple scenarios:
ρ(X) = f(ρ1(X), ρ2(X), . . . , ρm(X)), (17)
where f : Rm → R is called a scenario aggregation function.
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We postulate that the scenario aggregation function f satisfies the following ax-
ioms:
Axiom B1. Positive homogeneity and translation scaling: f(ax˜ + b1) = af(x˜) +
sb, ∀x˜ ∈ Rm, ∀a ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ R, where s > 0 is a constant and 1 := (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ Rm.
Axiom B2. Monotonicity: f(x˜) ≤ f(y˜), if x˜ ≤ y˜, where x˜ ≤ y˜ means xi ≤ yi, i =
1, . . . , m.
Axiom B3. Uncertainty aversion: if f(x˜) = f(y˜), then for any α ∈ (0, 1), f(αx˜ +
(1− α)y˜) ≤ f(x˜).
Axiom B1 states that if the risk measurement of Y is an affine function of that
of X under each scenario, then the aggregate risk measurement of Y is also an affine
function of that of X . Axiom B2 states that if the risk measurement of X is less
than or equal to that of Y under each scenario, then the aggregate risk measurement
of X is also less than or equal to that of Y . Axiom B3 is proposed by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) to “capture the phenomenon of hedging”; it is used as one of the
axioms for the maxmin expected utility that incorporates robustness.
Lemma 3.1. A scenario aggregation function f : Rm → R satisfies Axioms B1-B3 if
and only if there exists a set of weightsW = {w˜} ⊂ Rm with each w˜ = (w1, . . . , wm) ∈
W satisfying wi ≥ 0 and
∑m
i=1wi = 1, such that
f(x˜) = s · sup
w˜∈W
{
m∑
i=1
wixi
}
, ∀x˜ ∈ Rm. (18)
Proof. First, we show that Axioms B1-B3 are equivalent to the Axioms C1-C4 in
Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) with ni = 1, i = 1, . . . , m. Axioms B1 and B2 are
the same as the Axioms C1 and C2, respectively. Axiom C4 holds for any function
when ni = 1, i = 1, . . . , m. Axioms C1 and C3 apparently implies Axiom B3. We
will then show that Axiom B1 and B3 imply Axiom C3. In fact, For any x˜ and y˜,
it follows from Axiom B1 that f(x˜ − f(x˜)/s) = f(y˜ − f(y˜)/s) = 0. Then, it follows
from Axioms B1 and B3 that f(x˜+ y˜)− f(x˜)− f(y˜) = f(x˜− f(x˜)/s+ y˜− f(y˜)/s) =
2f(1
2
(x˜ − f(x˜)/s) + 1
2
(y˜ − f(y˜)/s)) ≤ 2f(x˜ − f(x˜)/s) = 0. Hence, Axiom C3 holds.
Therefore, Axioms B1-B3 are equivalent to Axioms C1-C4, and hence the conclusion
of the lemma follows from Theorem 3.1 in Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013).
In the representation (18), each weight w˜ ∈ W can be regarded as a prior proba-
bility on the set of scenarios; more precisely, wi can be viewed as the likelihood that
the scenario i happens.
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Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 3.1 lead to the following class of risk measures:9
ρ(X) = s · sup
w˜∈W
{
m∑
i=1
wi
∫
X d(hi ◦ Pi)
}
. (19)
By Theorem 2, the requirement of elicitability under each scenario leads to the fol-
lowing tail risk measure
ρ(X) = s · sup
w˜∈W
{
m∑
i=1
wiMSi,αi(X)
}
, (20)
where MSi,αi(X) is the median shortfall of X at confidence level αi calculated under
the ith scenario (model). The risk measure ρ in (20) addresses the issue of model
uncertainty and incorporate robustness from two aspects: (i) under each scenario
i, MSi,αi is elicitable and statistically robust (Kou, Peng and Heyde (2006, 2013)
and Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010)); (ii) ρ incorporates multiple scenarios and
multiple priors on the set of scenarios.
4 Application to Basel Accord Capital Rule for
Trading Books
What risk measure should be used for setting capital requirements for banks is an im-
portant issue that has been under debate since the 2007 financial crisis. The Basel II
use a 99.9% VaR for setting capital requirements for banking books of financial institu-
tions (Gordy (2003)). The Basel II capital charge for the trading book on the tth day is
specified as ρt(Xt, Xt−1, . . . , Xt−59) := stmax
{
1
st
VaRt−1(Xt),
1
60
∑60
i=1VaRt−i(Xt−i+1)
}
,
where Xt−i is the trading book loss on the (t − i)th day; st ≥ 3 is a constant that
is specified by the regulator based on the backtesting result of the institution’s VaR
model; VaRt−i(Xt−i+1) is the 10-day VaR at 99% confidence level calculated on day
t − i, which corresponds to the ith model, i = 1, . . . , 60. Define the 61th model
under which X = 0 with probability one. Assume that the trading book composi-
tion and the size of the positions remain the same over the 60 day periods. Then,
Xt, Xt−1, . . . , Xt−59 can be regarded as the realization of the same random loss under
different distributions. In such case, the Basel II risk measure is a special case of
the class of risk measures considered in (20); it incorporates 61 models and two pri-
ors: one is w˜ = (1/s, 0, . . . , 0, 1− 1/s), the other w˜ = (1/60, 1/60, . . . , 1/60, 0). The
9Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) consider infP∈P
∫
u(X) dP without hi; see also Xia (2013).
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Basel 2.5 risk measure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009)) mitigates
the procyclicality of the Basel II risk measure by incorporating the “stressed VaR”
calculated under stressed market conditions such as financial crisis. The Basel 2.5
risk measure can also be written in the form of (20).
In a consultative document released by the Bank for International Settlement
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013)), the Basel Committee proposes
to “move from value-at-risk to expected shortfall,” which “measures the riskiness
of a position by considering both the size and the likelihood of losses above a cer-
tain confidence level.” The proposed new Basel (called Basel 3.5) capital charge for
the trading book measured on the tth day is defined as ρt(Xt, Xt−1, . . . , Xt−59) :=
smax
{
1
s
ESt−1(Xt),
1
60
∑60
i=1 ESt−i(Xt−i+1)
}
, where ESt−i(Xt−i+1) is the ES at 97.5%
confidence level calculated on day t− i, i = 1, . . . , 60. Assume that the trading book
composition and the size of the positions remain the same over the 60 day periods.
Then, the proposed Basel 3.5 risk measure is a special case of the class of risk measures
considered in (19).10
The major argument for the change from VaR to ES is that ES better captures
tail risk than VaR. The statement that the 99% VaR is 100 million dollars does no
carry information as to the size of loss in cases when the loss does exceed 100 million;
on the other hand, the 99% ES measures the mean of the size of loss given that the
loss exceeds the 99% VaR.
Although the argument sounds reasonable, ES is not the only risk measure that
captures tail risk; in particular, an alternative risk measure that captures tail risk is
median shortfall (MS), which, in contrast to expected shortfall, measures the median
rather than the mean of the tail loss distribution. For instance, in the aforementioned
example, if we want to capture the size and likelihood of loss beyond the 99% VaR
level, we can use either ES at 99% level, or, alternatively, MS at 99% level.
MS may be preferable than ES for setting capital requirements in banking reg-
ulation because (i) MS is elicitable but ES is not; and (ii) MS is robust but ES is
not (Kou, Peng and Heyde (2006, 2013) and Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010)).
Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013) show that robustness is indispensable for external risk
measures used for legal enforcement such as calculating capital requirements.
10The Basel II, Basel 2.5, and newly proposed risk measure (Basel 3.5) for the trading book are
also special cases of the class of risk measures called natural risk statistics proposed by Kou, Peng
and Heyde (2013). The natural risk statistics are axiomatized by a different set of axioms including
a comonotonic subadditivity axiom.
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To further compare the robustness of MS with ES, we carry out a simple empirical
study on the measurement of tail risk of S&P 500 daily return. We consider two
IGARCH(1, 1) models similar to the model of RiskMetrics:
• Model 1: IGARCH(1, 1) with conditional distribution being Gaussian
rt = µ+ σtǫt, σ
2
t = βσ
2
t−1 + (1− β)r
2
t−1, ǫt
d
∼ N(0, 1).
• Model 2: the same as model 1 except that the conditional distribution is spec-
ified as ǫt
d
∼ tν , where tν denotes t distribution with degree of freedom ν.
We respectively fit the two models to the historical data of daily returns of S&P
500 Index during 1/2/1980–11/26/2012 and then forecast the one-day MS and ES of
a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks that is worth 1,000,000 dollars on 11/26/2012. The
comparison of the forecasts of MS and ES under the two models is shown in Table
1, where ESα,i and MSα,i are the ESα and MSα calculated under the ith model,
respectively, i = 1, 2. It is clear from the table that the change of ES under the two
models (i.e., ESα,2 − ESα,1) is much larger than that of MS (i.e., MSα,2 − MSα,1),
indicating that ES is more sensitive to model misspecification than MS.
Table 1: The comparison of the forecasts of one-day MS and ES of a portfolio of S&P
500 stocks that is worth 1,000,000 dollars on 11/26/2012. ESα,i and MSα,i are the ES
and MS at level α calculated under the ith model, respectively, i = 1, 2. It is clear
that the change of ES under the two models (i.e., ESα,2 − ESα,1) is much larger than
that of MS (i.e., MSα,2 −MSα,1).
α
ES MS ESα,2−ESα,1
MSα,2−MSα,1
− 1
ESα,1 ESα,2 ESα,2 − ESα,1 MSα,1 MSα,2 MSα,2 −MSα,1
97.0% 19956 21699 1743 19070 19868 798 118.4%
97.5% 20586 22690 2104 19715 20826 1111 89.3%
98.0% 21337 23918 2581 20483 22011 1529 68.8%
98.5% 22275 25530 3254 21441 23564 2123 53.3%
99.0% 23546 27863 4317 22738 25807 3070 40.6%
99.5% 25595 32049 6454 24827 29823 4996 29.2%
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5 Comments
5.1 Criticism of Value-at-Risk
As pointed out by Aumann and Serrano (2008), “like any index or summary statistic,
. . . , the riskiness index summarizes a complex, high-dimensional object by a single
number. Needless to say, no index captures all the relevant aspects of the situation
being summarized.” Below are some popular criticisms of VaR in the literature.
(i) The VaR at level α does not provide information regarding the size of the tail
loss distribution beyond VaRα. However, the median shortfall at level α does address
this issue by measuring the median size of the tail loss distribution beyond VaRα.
(ii) There is a pathological counterexample that, for some level α, the VaRα of a
fully concentrated portfolio might be smaller than that of a fully diversified portfolio,
which is against the economic intuition that diversification reduces risk; see Example
6.7 in McNeil et al. (2005, p. 241). However, this counterexample disappears if
α > 98%.
(iii) VaR does not satisfy the mathematical axiom of subadditivity (Huber (1981),
Artzner et al. (1999))11. However, the subadditivity axiom is somewhat controversial:
(1) The subadditivity axiom is based on an intuition that “a merger does not create
extra risk” (Artzner et al. (1999), p. 209), which may not be true, as can be seen
from the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch in 2008. (2) Subadditivity is
related to the idea that diversification is beneficial; however, diversification may not
always be beneficial. Fama and Miller (1972, pp. 271–272) show that diversification is
ineffective for asset returns with heavy tails (with tail index less than 1); these results
are extended in Ibragimov and Walden (2007) and Ibragimov (2009). See Kou, Peng
and Heyde (2013, Sec. 6.1) for more discussion. (3) Although subadditivity ensures
that ρ(X1) + ρ(X2) is an upper bound for ρ(X1 + X2), this upper bound may not
be valid in face of model uncertainty.12 (4) In practice, ρ(X1) + ρ(X2) may not be
a useful upper bound for ρ(X1 + X2) as the former may be too much larger than
11The representation theorem in Artzner et al. (1999) is based on Huber (1981), who use the
same set of axioms. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) obtains a more general representation based on
a different set of axioms.
12In fact, suppose we are concerned with obtaining an upper bound for ESα(X1+X2). In practice,
due to model uncertainty, we can only compute ÊSα(X1) and ÊSα(X2), which are estimates of
ESα(X1) and ESα(X2) respectively. ÊSα(X1) + ÊSα(X2) cannot be used as an upper bound for
ESα(X1 +X2) because it is possible that ÊSα(X1) + ÊSα(X2) < ESα(X1) + ESα(X2).
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the latter.13 (5) Subadditivity is not necessarily needed for capital allocation or asset
allocation.14 (6) It is often argued that if a non-subadditive risk measure is used
in determining the regulatory capital for a financial institution, then to reduce its
regulatory capital, the institution has an incentive to legally break up into various
subsidiaries. However, breaking up an institution into subsidiaries may not be bad,
as it prevents the loss of one single business unit from causing the bankruptcy of the
entire institution. On the contrary, if a subadditive risk measure is used, then that
institution has an incentive to merge with other financial institutions, which may lead
to financial institutions that are too big to fail. Hence, it is not clear by using this
type of argument alone whether a risk measure should be subadditive or not.
Even if one believes in subadditivity, VaR (and median shortfall) satisfies subad-
ditivity in most relevant situations. In fact, Dan´ıelsson, Jorgensen, Samorodnitsky,
Sarma and de Vries (2013) show that VaR (and median shortfall) is subadditive in
the relevant tail region if asset returns are regularly varying and possibly dependent,
although VaR does not satisfy global subadditivity. Ibragimov and Walden (2007)
and Ibragimov (2009) show that VaR is subadditive for the infinite variance stable
distributions with finite mean. “In this sense, they showed that VaR is subadditive
for the tails of all fat distributions, provided the tails are not super fat (e.g., Cauchy
distribution)” (Gaglianone, Lima, Linton and Smith (2011)). Garcia, Renault and
Tsafack (2007) stress that “tail thickness required [for VaR] to violate subadditivity,
even for small probabilities, remains an extreme situation because it corresponds to
such poor conditioning information that expected loss appears to be infinite.”
(iv) Embrechts et al. (2014) argue that “with respect to dependence uncertainty
in aggregation, VaR is less robust compared to expected shortfall” because VaR is
not aggregation-robust but expected shortfall is. However, their counterexample (i.e.,
their Example 2.1) only shows that VaR may not be aggregation-robust at the level α
such that F−1(·) is not continuous at α. There are only at most a countable number
13For example, let X1 be the loss of a long position of a call option on a stock (whose price is $100)
at strike $100 and let X2 be the loss of a short position of a call option on that stock at strick $95.
Then the margin requirement for X1+X2, ρ(X1+X2), should not be larger than $5, as X1+X2 ≤ 5.
However, ρ(X1) = 0 and ρ(X2) ≈ 20 (the margin is around 20% of the underlying stock price). In
this case, no one would use the subadditivity to charge the upper bound ρ(X1) + ρ(X2) ≈ 20 as the
margin for the portfolio X1 +X2; instead, people will directly compute ρ(X1 +X2).
14 Kou, Peng and Heyde (2013, Sec. 7) derive the Euler capital allocation rule for a class of risk
measures including VaR with scenario analysis and the Basel Accord risk measures. see Shi and
Werker (2012), Wen, Peng, Liu, Bai and Sun (2013), Xi, Coleman and Li (2013), and the references
therein for asset allocation methods using VaR and Basel Accord risk measures.
27
of such α; in fact, if F is a continuous distribution, then no such α exists. On the
contrary, for any other α, VaR at level α is aggregation-robust, because VaR at level
α is Hampel-robust and Hampel-robustness implies aggregation-robustness;15 note
that by Corollary 3.7 of Cont, Deguest and Scandolo (2010) expected shortfall is not
Hampel-robust.
(iv) Expected shortfall is more conservative than VaR because ESα > VaRα. This
argument is misleading because ES at level α should be compared with VaR at level
(1+α)/2 (i.e. MS at level α). ESα may be smaller (i.e., less conservative) than MSα,
as mean may be smaller than median. For example, if the tail loss distribution is
a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter lager than 3.44, then ESα is smaller
than MSα (see, e.g., Von Hippel (2005)).
5.2 Other Comments
It is worth noting that it is not desirable for a risk measure to be too sensitive to the
tail risk. For example, let L denote the loss that could occur to a person who walks
on the street. There is a very small but positive probability that the person could
be hit by a car and lose his life; in that unfortunate case, L may be infinite. Hence,
the ES of L may be equal to infinity, suggesting that the person should never walk
on the street, which is apparently not reasonable. In contrast, the MS of L is a finite
number.
Theorem 2.1 generalizes the main result in Ziegel (2013), which shows the only
elicitable spectral risk measure is the mean functional; note that VaR is not a spectral
risk measure. Weber (2006) derives a characterization theorem (Theorem 3.1) for
risk measures with convex acceptance set N and convex rejection set N c under two
topological conditions on N : (1) there exists x ∈ R with δx ∈ N such that for y ∈ R
and δy ∈ N c, (1 − α)δx + αδy ∈ N for sufficiently small α > 0; (2) N is ψ-weakly
closed for some gauge function ψ : R→ [1,∞). That characterization theorem cannot
15Aggregation-robustness is a notion of robustness that is weaker than Hampel-robustness. By
Theorem 2.21 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009), a risk measure (statistical functional) ρ is Hampel-
robust at a distribution F is essentially equivalent to that ρ is weakly continuous at F . More precisely,
if ρ is Hampel robust at F , then for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for ∀G ∈ Nδ(F ) := {H |
d(F,H) < δ}, it holds that |ρ(F )−ρ(G)| < ǫ. In contrast, ρ is aggregation-robust at F means that for
any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for ∀G ∈ Nδ(F )∩AF , it holds that |ρ(F )− ρ(G)| < ǫ, where
AF := {H | There exist integer m > 0 and random variables X1, . . . , Xm, X ′1, . . . , X
′
m, such that
Xi
d
∼ X ′i, i = 1, . . . ,m,
∑m
i=1Xi
d
∼ F, and
∑m
i=1X
′
i
d
∼ H.}. Since Nδ(F )∩AF  Nδ(F ), aggregation
robustness is weaker than Hampel-robustness.
28
be applied in this paper because we do not make any assumption on the forecasting
objective function S(·, ·) in the definition of elicitability and hence the topological
conditions may not hold. For example, the results in Bellini and Bignozzi (2013),
which rely on the characterization theorem in Weber (2006), make strong assumptions
on the forecasting objective function S(·, ·),16 requiring a more restrictive definition
of elicitability than Gneiting (2011); under their definition, median or quantile may
not be elicitable, while they are always elicitable in the sense of Gneiting (2011). The
elicitability of a risk measure is also related to the statistical theory for the evaluation
of probability forecasts (Lai, Shen and Gross (2011)).
The axioms in this paper are based on economic considerations. Other axioms
based on mathematical considerations include convexity (Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002),
Frittelli and Gianin (2002, 2005)), comonotonic subadditivity (Song and Yan (2006,
2009), Kou, Peng and Heyde (2006, 2013)), comonotonic convexity (Song and Yan
(2006, 2009)). Dhaene, Vanduffel, Goovaerts, Kaas, Tang and Vyncke (2006) provides
a survey on comonotonicity and risk measures.
A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Without loss of generality, we only need to prove for the case s = 1, as ρ
satisfies Axioms A1-A5 if and only if 1
s
ρ satisfies Axioms A1-A5 (with s = 1 in
Axiom A3).
The “only if” part. First, we show that (2) holds for any X ∈ L∞(Ω,F , P ). Define
the set function ν(E) := ρ(1E), E ∈ F . Then, it follows from Axiom A2 and A3 that
ν is monotonic, ν(∅) = 0, and ν(Ω) = 1. For M ≥ 1, define LM := {X | |X| ≤ M}.
For any X ∈ L∞(Ω,F , P ), let M0 be the essential supremum of |X| and denote
XM0 := min(M0,max(X,−M0)). Then XM0 ∈ LM0 and X = XM0 a.s., which implies
that ρ(X) = ρ(XM0) (by Axiom A4) and ν(X > x) = ν(XM0 > x), ∀x. Since ρ
satisfies Axioms A1-A3 on L∞(Ω,F , P ), it follows that ρ satisfies the conditions (i)-
(iii) of the Corollary in Section 3 of Schmeidler (1986) (with B(K) in the corollary
16These assumptions include three conditions in Definition 3.1 and two conditions in Theorem
4.2: (1) S(x, y) is continuous in y; (2) for any x ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ] with ǫ > 0, S(x, y) ≤ ψ(y) for some gauge
function ψ.
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defined to be L1+M0). Hence, it follows from the Corollary that
ρ(X) = ρ(XM0) =
∫ ∞
0
ν(XM0 > x)dx+
∫ 0
−∞
(ν(XM0 > x)− 1)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
ν(X > x)dx+
∫ 0
−∞
(ν(X > x)− 1)dx. (21)
Let U be a uniform U(0, 1) random variable. Define the function h such that h(0) = 0,
h(1) = 1, and h(p) := ρ(1{U≤p}), ∀p ∈ (0, 1). By Axiom A4, h(·) satisfies ν(A) =
h(P (A)) for all A. Therefore, by (21), (2) holds for X . In addition, for any 0 < q <
p < 1, h(p) = ρ(1{U≤p}) ≥ ρ(1{U≤q}) = h(q). Hence, h is an increasing function.
Second, we show that (2) holds for any (possibly unbounded) X ∈ X . ForM > 0,
since XM belongs to L∞(Ω,F , P ), it follows that (2) holds for XM , which implies
ρ(XM) =
∫ ∞
0
h(P (XM > x))dx+
∫ 0
−∞
(h(P (XM > x))− 1)dx
=
∫ M
0
h(P (X > x))dx+
∫ 0
−M
(h(P (X > x))− 1)dx.
LettingM →∞ on both sides of the above equation and using Axiom A5, we conclude
that (2) holds for X .
The “if” part. Suppose h is a distortion function and ρ is defined by (2). Define the
set function ν(A) := h(P (A)), ∀A ∈ F . Then ρ(X) is the Choquet integral of X with
respect to ν. By definition of ρ and simple verification, ρ satisfies Axioms A2-A5. It
follows from Denneberg (1994, Proposition 5.1) that ρ satisfies positive homogeneity
and comonotonic additivity, which implies that ρ satisfies Axiom A1.
B Proof of Theorem 2.1
First, we give the following definition:17
Definition B.1. A single-valued statistical functional ρ is said to have convex level
sets with respect to P, if for any two distributions F1 ∈ P and F2 ∈ P, ρ(F1) = ρ(F2)
implies that ρ(λF1 + (1− λ)F2) = ρ(F1), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
The following Lemma B.1 gives a necessary condition for a single-valued statisti-
cal functional to be elicitable. The lemma is a variant of Proposition 2.5 of Osband
17A similar definition for a set-valued (not single-valued) statistical functional is given in Osband
(1985) and Gneiting (2011).
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(1985), Lemma 1 of Lambert, Pennock and Shoham (2008), and Theorem 6 of Gneit-
ing (2011), which concern set-valued statistical functionals.
Lemma B.1. If a single-valued statistical functional ρ is elicitable with respect to P,
then ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Proof. Suppose ρ is elicitable. Then there exists a forecasting objective function
S(x, y) such that (6) holds. For any two distribution F1 and F2 and any λ ∈ (0, 1),
denote Fλ := λF1 + (1 − λ)F2. If t = ρ(F1) = ρ(F2), then t = min{x | x ∈
argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFi(y)}, i = 1, 2. Since
∫
S(x, y)dFλ(y) = λ
∫
S(x, y)dF1(y) +
(1 − λ)
∫
S(x, y)dF2(y), it follows that t ∈ argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFλ(y). For any t
′ ∈
argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFλ(y), it holds that
∫
S(t′, y)dFλ(y) ≤
∫
S(t, y)dFλ(y), which im-
plies that λ
∫
S(t′, y)dF1(y) + (1 − λ)
∫
S(t′, y)dF2(y) ≤ λ
∫
S(t, y)dF1(y) + (1 −
λ)
∫
S(t, y)dF2(y). However, by definition of t,
∫
S(t, y)dFi(y) ≤
∫
S(t′, y)dFi(y), i =
1, 2. Therefore,
∫
S(t, y)dFi(y) =
∫
S(t′, y)dFi(y), i = 1, 2, which implies that t
′ ∈
argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFi(y), i = 1, 2. Since t = min{x | x ∈ argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFi(y)},
it follows that t′ ≥ t. Therefore, t = min{x | x ∈ argminx
∫
S(x, y)dFλ(y)} =
ρ(Fλ).
Lemma B.2. Let c ∈ [0, 1] be a constant. If ρ is defined in (2) with h(u) = 1 −
c, ∀u ∈ (0, 1), h(0) = 0, and h(1) = 1, then ρ = cVaR0 + (1 − c)VaR1, where
VaR0(F ) := inf{x | F (x) > 0} and VaR1(F ) := inf{x | F (x) = 1}. In addition, ρ
has convex level sets with respect to P = {F | ρ(F ) is well defined}.
Proof. If VaR0(F ) ≥ 0, then
ρ(F ) =
∫
(0,VaR0(F ))
h(1− F (x)) dx+
∫
(VaR0(F ),VaR1(F ))
h(1− F (x)) dx
+
∫
(VaR1(F ),∞)
h(1− F (x)) dx
= VaR0(F ) + (1− c)(VaR1(F )− VaR0(F )) = cVaR0(F ) + (1− c)VaR1(F ).
If VaR0(F ) < 0, similar calculation also leads to ρ(F ) = cVaR0(F )+ (1− c)VaR1(F ).
Suppose t = ρ(F1) = ρ(F2). Denote Fλ := λF1 + (1− λ)F2, λ ∈ (0, 1). There are
three cases:
(i) c = 0. Then, t = VaR1(F1) = VaR1(F2). By definition of VaR1, Fi(x) < 1 for
x < t and Fi(x) = 1 for x ≥ t. Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that Fλ(x) < 1 for
x < t and Fλ(x) = 1 for x ≥ t. Hence, ρ(Fλ) = VaR1(Fλ) = t.
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(ii) c ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, suppose VaR0(F1) ≤ VaR0(F2). Since
t = cVaR0(F1) + (1 − c)VaR1(F1) = cVaR0(F2) + (1 − c)VaR1(F2), VaR1(F1) ≥
VaR1(F2). Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), VaR0(Fλ) = VaR0(F1) and VaR1(Fλ) =
VaR1(F1). Hence, ρ(Fλ) = t.
(iii) c = 1. Then, t = VaR0(F1) = VaR0(F2). By definition of VaR0, Fi(x) = 0 for
x < t and Fi(x) > 0 for x > t. Hence, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that Fλ(x) = 0 for
x < t and Fλ(x) > 0 for x > t. Hence, ρ(Fλ) = VaR0(Fλ) = t.
Lemma B.3. Let α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1]. Let ρ be defined in (2) with h being
defined as h(x) := (1− c) · 1{x=1−α} + 1{x>1−α}. Then
ρ(F ) = cq−α (F ) + (1− c)q
+
α (F ), ∀F ∈ P, (22)
where q−α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) ≥ α} and q
+
α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) > α}. Furthermore, ρ
has convex level sets with respect to P = {FX | X is a proper random variable}.
Proof. Define g(x) := 1− h(1− x), x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, g(x) = c · 1{x=α}+ 1{x>α}, and ρ
can be represented as
ρ(F ) = −
∫ 0
−∞
g(F (x))dx+
∫ ∞
0
(1− g(F (x)))dx.
Note that F (x) = α for x ∈ [q−α (F ), q
+
α (F )). Consider three cases:
(i) q−α (F ) ≥ 0. In this case,
ρ(F ) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− g(F (x)))dx
=
∫
[0,q−α (F ))
(1− g(F (x)))dx+
∫
[q−α (F ),q
+
α (F ))
(1− g(F (x)))dx+
∫
(q+α (F ),∞)
(1− g(F (x)))dx
= q−α (F ) + (1− c)(q
+
α (F )− q
−
α (F )) = cq
−
α (F ) + (1− c)q
+
α (F ).
(ii) q−α (F ) < 0 < q
+
α (F ). In this case,
ρ(F ) = −
∫
(q−α (F ),0)
g(F (x))dx+
∫
(0,q+α (F ))
(1− g(F (x)))dx = cq−α (F ) + (1− c)q
+
α (F ).
(iii) q+α (F ) ≤ 0. In this case,
ρ(F ) = −
∫
(−∞,q−α (F ))
g(F (x))dx−
∫
(q−α (F ),q
+
α (F ))
g(F (x))dx−
∫
(q+α (F ),0)
g(F (x))dx
= −c(q+α (F )− q
−
α (F )) + q
+
α (F ) = cq
−
α (F ) + (1− c)q
+
α (F ),
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which completes the proof of (22).
We then show that ρ has convex level sets with respect to P. Suppose that
ρ(F1) = ρ(F2). Then
cq−α (F1) + (1− c)q
+
α (F1) = cq
−
α (F2) + (1− c)q
+
α (F2). (23)
For λ ∈ (0, 1), define Fλ := λF1 + (1− λ)F2. There are three cases:
(i) c = 0. Then, ρ = q+α . Denote t = q
+
α (F1) = q
+
α (F2), then Fi(x) > α for x > t
and Fi(x) ≤ α for x < t, i = 1, 2. Hence, Fλ(x) > α for x > t and Fλ(x) ≤ α for
x < t, which implies t = q+α (Fλ), i.e., q
+
α has convex level sets with respect to P.
(ii) c ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, assume q−α (F1) ≥ q
−
α (F2). Then it follows
from (23) that q+α (F1) ≤ q
+
α (F2). Therefore, [q
−
α (F1), q
+
α (F1)] ⊂ [q
−
α (F2), q
+
α (F2)].
There are two subcases: (ii.i) q−α (F1) < q
+
α (F1). In this case, Fλ(x) < α for x <
q−α (F1); Fλ(x) = α for x ∈ [q
−
α (F1), q
+
α (F1)); and Fλ(x) > α for x > q
+
α (F1). Therefore,
q−α (Fλ) = q
−
α (F1) and q
+
α (Fλ) = q
+
α (F1), which implies that ρ(Fλ) = ρ(F1). (ii.ii)
q−α (F1) = q
+
α (F1). In this case, Fλ(x) < α for x < q
−
α (F1) and Fλ(x) > α for
x > q+α (F1). Therefore, q
−
α (Fλ) = q
−
α (F1) and q
+
α (Fλ) = q
+
α (F1), which implies that
ρ(Fλ) = ρ(F1). Therefore, ρ has convex level sets.
(iii) c = 1. Then, ρ = q−α = VaRα. Denote t = q
−
α (F1) = q
−
α (F2), then Fi(x) < α
for x < t and Fi(x) ≥ α for x ≥ t, i = 1, 2. Hence, Fλ(x) < α for x < t and Fλ(x) ≥ α
for x ≥ t, which implies that q−α (Fλ) = t, i.e., q
−
α has convex level sets with respect
to P.
Next, we prove the following Theorem B.1, which shows that among the class
of risk measures based on Choquet expected utility theory, only four kinds of risk
measures satisfy the necessary condition of being elicitable.
Theorem B.1. Let P0 be the set of distributions with finite support. Let h be a
distortion function defined on [0, 1] and let ρ(·) be defined as in (2). Then, ρ(·) has
convex level sets with respect to P0 if and only if one of the following four cases holds:
(i) There exists c ∈ [0, 1], such that ρ = cVaR0 + (1 − c)VaR1, where VaR0(F ) :=
inf{x | F (x) > 0} and VaR1(F ) := inf{x | F (x) = 1}.
(ii) There exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ(F ) = VaRα(F ), ∀F .
(iii) There exists α ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ [0, 1) such that
ρ(F ) = cq−α (F ) + (1− c)q
+
α (F ), ∀F, (24)
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where q−α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) ≥ α} and q
+
α (F ) := inf{x | F (x) > α}.
(iv) ρ(F ) =
∫
xdF (x), ∀F .
Furthermore, the risk measures listed above have convex level sets with respect to P
defined in Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem B.1. Define g(u) := 1 − h(1 − u), u ∈ [0, 1]. Then g(0) = 0,
g(1) = 1, and g is increasing on [0, 1]. And then, ρ can be represented as
ρ(F ) = −
∫ 0
−∞
g(F (x))dx+
∫ ∞
0
(1− g(F (x)))dx.
For a discrete distribution F =
∑n
i=1 piδxi, where 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < · · · < xn, pi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , n, and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1, it can be shown by simple calculation that ρ(F ) =
g(p1)x1 +
∑n
i=2(g(
∑i
j=1 pj)− g(
∑i−1
j=1 pj))xi.
There are three cases for g:
Case (i): for any q ∈ (0, 1), g(q) = 0. Then g(u) = 1{u=1}. By Lemma B.2 (with
c = 0), ρ = VaR1 and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Case (ii): there exists q0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q0) = 1 and g(q) ∈ {0, 1} for all
q ∈ (0, 1). Let α = inf{q | g(q) = 1}. There are three subcases: (ii.i) α = 0. Then,
g(u) = 1{u>0}. By Lemma B.2 (with c = 1), ρ = VaR0 and ρ has convex level sets
with respect to P. (ii.ii) α ∈ (0, 1) and g(α) = 1. Then, g(u) = 1{u≥α}. By Lemma
B.3 (with c = 1), ρ = q−α = VaRα and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
(ii.iii) α ∈ (0, 1) and g(α) = 0. Then, g(u) = 1{u>α}. By Lemma B.3 (with c = 0),
ρ = q+α and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Case (iii): there exists q ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1). Suppose ρ has convex
level sets with respect to P0. For any 0 < x1 < x2 and q ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy
1 = ρ(δ1) = ρ(qδx1 + (1− q)δx2) = x1g(q) + x2(1− g(q)), (25)
since ρ has convex level sets, it follows that
1 = ρ(v(qδx1 + (1− q)δx2) + (1− v)δ1), ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (26)
For any q ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1), (25) holds for any (x1, x2) = (1 −
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c,− g(q)
1−g(q)
(1− c) + 1
1−g(q)
), ∀c ∈ (0, 1). Noting that x1 < 1 < x2, (26) implies
1 = ρ(v(qδx1 + (1− q)δx2) + (1− v)δ1)
= x1g(vq) + g(vq + 1− v)− g(vq) + x2(1− g(vq + 1− v))
= (1− c)g(vq) + g(vq + 1− v)− g(vq)
+
[
−
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− c) +
1
1− g(q)
]
(1− g(vq + 1− v))
= 1 + c
[
−g(vq) +
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− g(vq + 1− v))
]
, ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀c ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore,
−g(vq)+
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1−g(vq+1−v)) = 0, ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀q such that g(q) ∈ (0, 1). (27)
Let α = sup{q | g(q) = 0, q ∈ [0, 1]} and β = inf{q | g(q) = 1, q ∈ [0, 1]}. Since there
exists q0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q0) ∈ (0, 1), it follows that α ≤ q0 < 1, g(α) ≤ g(q0) < 1,
β ≥ q0 > 0, and g(β) ≥ g(q0) > 0.
There are four subcases:
Case (iii.i) α = β and g(α) = c ∈ (0, 1). In this case, α = β ∈ (0, 1). By the
definition of α and β, g(x) = 0 for x < α and g(x) = 1 for x > α. By Lemma B.3,
ρ = cq−α + (1− c)q
+
α and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Case (iii.ii) α < β and g(α) ∈ (0, 1). In this case, α ∈ (0, 1). It follows from
the definition of β that g((α + β)/2) < 1. Let ǫ0 = β − α. By the definition
of β, g(α + ǫ) < 1 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). In addition, g(α + ǫ) ≥ g(α) > 0 for all
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Hence, g(α + ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). For any η ∈ (0, α) and
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), let q = α + ǫ and v =
α−η
α+ǫ
. Then it follows from the definition of α that
g(vq) = g(α−η) = 0, which implies from (27) that 1 = g(vq+1−v) = g(α−η+ ǫ+η
α+ǫ
),
for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), η ∈ (0, α). Then, g(α+) = limǫ↓0,η↓0 g(α − η +
ǫ+η
α+ǫ
) = 1, which
contradicts to g(α+) ≤ g((α+ β)/2) < 1. Therefore, this case does not hold.
Case (iii.iii) α < β, g(α) = 0, and g(β) ∈ (0, 1). Since g(β) ∈ (0, 1), it follows
that β ∈ (0, 1). By the definition of β, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β), g(β + η) = 1.
By the definition of α, g((β + α)/2) > 0. Hence, g(β−) ≥ g((β + α)/2) > 0.
Hence, there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that g(β − ǫ) > 0 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). On the
other hand, g(β − ǫ) ≤ g(β) < 1 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Hence, g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for
any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), let q = β − ǫ and
v = 1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
. Then, we have g(vq + 1 − v) = g(β + η) = 1. Since g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for
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ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), it follows from (27) that 0 = g(vq) = g(
1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
(β − ǫ)), which implies that
g(β−) = limη↓0,ǫ↓0 g(
1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
(β − ǫ)) = 0. This contradicts to g(β−) > 0. Therefore,
this case does not hold.
Case (iii.iv) α < β, g(α) = 0, g(β) = 1. Let q0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(q0) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, α < q0 < β. We will show that either there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such
that g(u) = c, ∀u ∈ (0, 1), or g(u) = u, ∀u ∈ (0, 1).
First, we will show that α = 0 and β = 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that α > 0. Since α < q0, it follows that g(α + ǫ) < 1 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), where
ǫ0 = q0−α. Furthermore, by the definition of α, g(α+ǫ) > 0 for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Hence,
g(α+ ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). For any η ∈ (0, α) and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), let q = α+ ǫ and
v = α−η
α+ǫ
. Then it follows from the definition of α that g(vq) = g(α − η) = 0, which
implies from (27) that 1 = g(vq+1−v) = g(α−η+ ǫ+η
α+ǫ
), for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), η ∈ (0, α).
Then, g(α+) = limǫ↓0,η↓0 g(α− η+
ǫ+η
α+ǫ
) = 1, which contradicts to g(α+) ≤ g(q0) < 1.
Therefore, α = 0.
In addition, suppose for the sake of contradiction that β < 1. Then, by the
definition of β, for any η ∈ (0, 1 − β), g(β + η) = 1. Let ǫ0 = β − q0. Since β > q0,
g(β − ǫ) ≥ g(q0) > 0 for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). By the definition of β, g(β − ǫ) < 1 for any
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Hence, g(β−ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Then, for any η ∈ (0, 1−β) and
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), let q = β − ǫ and v =
1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
. Then, we have g(vq+1− v) = g(β + η) = 1.
Since g(β − ǫ) ∈ (0, 1) for any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0), it follows from (27) that 0 = g(vq) =
g(1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
(β − ǫ)), which implies that g(β−) = limη↓0,ǫ↓0 g(
1−β−η
1−β+ǫ
(β − ǫ)) = 0. This
contradicts to that g(β−) ≥ g(q0) > 0. Therefore, β = 1.
Then, it follows from α = 0 and β = 1 that
g(q) ∈ (0, 1), ∀q ∈ (0, 1). (28)
Therefore, it follows from (27) and (28) that
−g(vq) +
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− g(vq + 1− v)) = 0, ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀q ∈ (0, 1). (29)
For any q ∈ (0, 1) and v ∈ (0, 1), vq + 1 − v > q and limv↑1(vq + 1− v) = q. It then
follows from (29) that
g(q−) = lim
v↑1
g(vq) = lim
v↑1
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− g(vq + 1− v)) =
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− g(q+)), ∀q ∈ (0, 1).
(30)
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Second, we consider two cases for g:
Case (iii.iv.i) There exist 0 < u1 < u2 < 1 such that g(u1) = g(u2). Let w1 =
inf{u | g(u) = g(u1)} and w2 = sup{u | g(u) = g(u2)}. Consider three further cases:
(a) w1 > 0. Since limq↓w1
1−u2
1−q
= 1−u2
1−w1
< 1 = limq↓w1
w1
q
, there exists q0 ∈ (w1, u2)
such that 1−u2
1−q0
< w1
q0
. Choose v0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
1−u2
1−q0
< v0 <
w1
q0
. Since v0q0 < w1,
g(v0q0) < g(u1). And, since w1 < q0 < v0q0 + 1− v0 < u2, g(q0) = g(v0q0 + 1− v0) =
g(u1). Therefore, −g(v0q0) +
g(q0)
1−g(q0)
(1 − g(v0q0 + 1 − v0)) > 0, which contradicts to
(29). Hence, this case cannot hold. (b) w2 < 1. Since limq↑w2
1−w2
1−q
= 1 > u1
w2
=
limq↑w2
u1
q
, there exists q0 ∈ (u1, w2) such that
1−w2
1−q0
> u1
q0
. Choose v0 ∈ (0, 1) such
that 1−w2
1−q0
> v0 >
u1
q0
. Since w2 > q0 > v0q0 > u1, g(q0) = g(v0q0) = g(u1). And, since
v0q0+1−v0 > w2, g(v0q0+1−v0) > g(u1). Therefore, −g(v0q0)+
g(q0)
1−g(q0)
(1−g(v0q0+
1− v0)) < 0, which contradicts to (29). Hence, this case cannot hold. (c) w1 = 0 and
w2 = 1. In this case, g(u) = c, ∀u ∈ (0, 1), for some constant c ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma
B.2, ρ = cVaR0 + (1− c)VaR1, and ρ has convex level sets with respect to P.
Case (iii.iv.ii) g is strictly increasing on (0, 1). Then, g(p1) − g(p2) 6= 0 for any
p1 6= p2. We will show that g(1−) = 1 and g(0+) = 0. Consider 0 < x1 < x2 < x3
and p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
ρ(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx2) = ρ(p2δx1 + (1− p2)δx3),
which is equivalent to
x1g(p1) + x2(1− g(p1)) = x1g(p2) + (1− g(p2))x3. (31)
Let x1
x2
= c1 and
x3
x2
= c3. Then, c1 ∈ (0, 1), c3 > 1, and (31) is equivalent to
c1 =
1− g(p2)
g(p1)− g(p2)
c3 −
1− g(p1)
g(p1)− g(p2)
. (32)
For any fixed 0 < p1 < p2 < 1 and 1 < c3 <
1−g(p1)
1−g(p2)
, define c1 as in (32). Then,
c1 ∈ (0, 1). For any such p1, p2, c3, and c1, it follows from the convexity of the level
sets of ρ that
x1g(p1) + x2(1− g(p1)) = ρ(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx2)
= ρ(v(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx2) + (1− v)(p2δx1 + (1− p2)δx3))
= ρ((vp1 + (1− v)p2)δx1 + v(1− p1)δx2 + (1− v)(1− p2)δx3)
= x1g(vp1 + (1− v)p2) + x2(g(v + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2))
+ x3(1− g(v + (1− v)p2)), ∀v ∈ (0, 1),
37
which is equivalent to
c1[g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)] + 1− g(p1)− g(v + (1− v)p2) + g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)
= c3[1− g(v + (1− v)p2)], ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
Plugging (32) into the above equation, we obtain that for any 0 < p1 < p2 < 1, any
1 < c3 <
1−g(p1)
1−g(p2)
, and any v ∈ (0, 1), it holds that
0 = c3
[
1− g(p2)
g(p1)− g(p2)
(g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2))− 1 + g(v + (1− v)p2)
]
−
1− g(p1)
g(p1)− g(p2)
[g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)] + 1− g(p1)
− g(v + (1− v)p2) + g(vp1 + (1− v)p2). (33)
Therefore,
0 =−
1− g(p1)
g(p1)− g(p2)
[g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)] + 1− g(p1)
− g(v + (1− v)p2) + g(vp1 + (1− v)p2), ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀p1 < p2,
which is equivalent to
0 = g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)(1− g(p2)) + g(v + (1− v)p2)(g(p2)− g(p1))
+ g(p1)g(p2)− g(p2), ∀v ∈ (0, 1), ∀p1 < p2. (34)
Letting v ↑ 1 in (34), we obtain
0 = g(p1+)(1− g(p2)) + g(1−)(g(p2)− g(p1)) + g(p1)g(p2)− g(p2), ∀p1 < p2. (35)
Since g is increasing on (0, 1), there exists p∗1 ∈ (0, 1), such that g is continuous at p
∗
1.
Choose any p∗2 > p
∗
1. Letting p1 = p
∗
1 and p2 = p
∗
2 in (35) leads to (g(p
∗
1)− g(p
∗
2))(1−
g(1−)) = 0. Since g is strictly increasing, it follows that
g(1−) = 1. (36)
Letting q = 1
2
in (29) leads to
g(v
2
)
1− g(1− v
2
)
=
g(1
2
)
1− g(1
2
)
, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (37)
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It follows from (37) and (36) that
g(0+) = lim
v↓0
g(
v
2
) = lim
v↓0
g(1
2
)
1− g(1
2
)
(1− g(1−
v
2
)) =
g(1
2
)
1− g(1
2
)
(1− g(1−)) = 0. (38)
We will then show that g is continuous on (0, 1). By (29), we have
g(v−) = lim
q↑1
g(vq) = lim
q↑1
g(q)
1− g(q)
(1− g(vq + 1− v))
= lim
q↑1
g(q) lim
q↑1
1− g(vq + 1− v)
1− g(q)
= g(1−) lim
q↑1
1− g(vq + 1− v)
g((1− q)v)
g((1− q)v)
g(1− q)
g(1− q)
1− g(q)
= lim
q↑1
1− g(1
2
)
g(1
2
)
g((1− q)v)
g(1− q)
g(1
2
)
1− g(1
2
)
(by (36) and (37))
= lim
q↑1
g((1− q)v)
g(1− q)
= lim
q↓0
g(qv)
g(q)
, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (39)
Now consider 0 = x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 and p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
ρ(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx3) = ρ(p2δx2 + (1− p2)δx4),
which is equivalent to
x1g(p1) + x3(1− g(p1)) = x2g(p2) + x4(1− g(p2)). (40)
Since ρ has convex level sets, it follows that for any v ∈ (0, 1), it holds that
x3(1− g(p1)) = x1g(p1) + x3(1− g(p1)) = ρ(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx3)
= ρ(v(p1δx1 + (1− p1)δx3) + (1− v)(p2δx2 + (1− p2)δx4))
= ρ(vp1δx1 + (1− v)p2δx2 + v(1− p1)δx3 + (1− v)(1− p2)δx4)
= x2(g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1))
+ x3(g(v + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)) + x4(1− g(v + (1− v)p2)). (41)
Let x3
x2
= 1 + c3 and
x4
x2
= 1 + c3 + c4. Then, c3 > 0, c4 > 0, and (40) becomes
c3 =
1− g(p2)
g(p2)− g(p1)
c4 +
g(p1)
g(p2)− g(p1)
. (42)
Furthermore, (41) is equivalent to
0 = g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1) + (1 + c3 + c4)(1− g(v + (1− v)p2))
+ (1 + c3)(g(v + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− 1 + g(p1)), ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (43)
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For any 0 < p1 < p2 < 1 and c4 > 0, let c3 be defined in (42). Then, c3 > 0. Hence,
(43) holds for any such p1, p2, c3, and c4. Plugging (42) into (43), we obtain that for
any 0 < p1 < p2 < 1 and any c4 > 0, it holds that
0 = g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1) +
g(p2)
g(p2)− g(p1)
[g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)]
+ c4
1− g(p2)
g(p2)− g(p1)
[g(v + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− 1 + g(p1)]
+ c4
1− g(p1)
g(p2)− g(p1)
[1− g(v + (1− v)p2)], ∀v ∈ (0, 1), (44)
which implies that
0 = g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)− g(vp1)
+
g(p2)
g(p2)− g(p1)
[g(p1)− g(vp1 + (1− v)p2)], ∀0 < p1 < p2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1),
which can be simplified to be
−g(vp1+ (1− v)p2)− (g(p2)− g(p1))
g(vp1)
g(p1)
+ g(p2) = 0, ∀p1 < p2, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (45)
Letting p2 ↑ 1 in (45) and applying (36), we obtain
−g((vp1 + 1− v)−)− (1− g(p1))
g(vp1)
g(p1)
+ 1 = 0, ∀0 < p1 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (46)
Then, it follows from (29) and (46) that
g((vp1 + 1− v)−) = g(vp1 + 1− v), ∀0 < p1 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1),
which implies that
g(v−) = g(v), ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (47)
It follows from (30) and (47) that g is continuous on (0, 1), i.e.,
g(v−) = g(v) = g(v+), ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (48)
Lastly, we will show that g(u) = u for any u ∈ (0, 1). Letting p1 ↓ 0 in (45), we
obtain
−g(((1− v)p2)+)− (g(p2)− g(0+)) lim
p1↓0
g(vp1)
g(p1)
+ g(p2) = 0, ∀0 < p2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1).
(49)
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Applying (38), (39), and (48) to (49), we obtain
g((1− v)p2) = g(p2)(1− g(v)), ∀0 < p2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (50)
Letting p2 ↑ 1 in (50) and using (36) and (48), we obtain
g(1− v) = g(1−)(1− g(v)) = 1− g(v), ∀v ∈ (0, 1), (51)
which in combination with (50) implies
g(vp2) = g(v)g(p2), ∀0 < p2 < 1, ∀v ∈ (0, 1). (52)
In the following, we will show by induction that
g(
k
2n
) =
k
2n
, k = 1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1, ∀n ∈ N. (53)
Letting v = 1
2
in (51), we obtain g(1
2
) = 1
2
. Hence, (53) holds for n = 1. Suppose (53)
holds for n. We will show that it also holds for n+1. In fact, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ 2n−1−1,
since 1 ≤ 2k + 1 ≤ 2n − 1, it follows from (52) that
g(
2k + 1
2n+1
) = g(
1
2
)g(
2k + 1
2n
) =
2k + 1
2n+1
, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2n−1 − 1. (54)
For any 2n−1 ≤ k ≤ 2n − 1, it holds that 1 ≤ 2n+1 − (2k + 1) ≤ 2n − 1. Hence, it
follows from (51) that
g(
2k + 1
2n+1
) = 1− g(
2n+1 − (2k + 1)
2n+1
) = 1−
2n+1 − (2k + 1)
2n+1
(by (54))
=
2k + 1
2n+1
, 2n−1 ≤ k ≤ 2n − 1. (55)
In addition, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n − 1, g( 2k
2n+1
) = g( k
2n
) = k
2n
, which in combination
with (54) and (55) implies that (53) holds for n+1, and hence holds for any n. Since
{k/2n, k = 1, . . . , 2n − 1, n ∈ N} is dense on (0, 1) and g is continuous on (0, 1), it
follows from (53) that g(u) = u for all u ∈ (0, 1), which completes the proof.
Finally, the proof of Theorem 2.1 is as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By Lemma B.1 and Theorem B.1, only those risk measures
listed in cases (i)-(iv) of Theorem B.1 satisfy the necessary condition for being an
elicitable risk measure. Therefore, we only need to study the elicitability of those risk
measures.
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First, we will show that for c ∈ (0, 1], ρ = cVaR0 + (1 − c)VaR1 is not elicitable.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ρ is elicitable, then there exists a function
S such that (6) holds. For any u, letting F = δu in (6) and noting ρ(δu) = u yields
S(u, u) ≤ S(x, u), ∀x, ∀u, and the equality holds only if u ≤ x. (56)
For any u < v and p ∈ (0, 1), letting F = pδu + (1 − p)δv in (6) yields pS(cu+ (1 −
c)v, u) + (1 − p)S(cu + (1 − c)v, v) ≤ pS(x, u) + (1 − p)S(x, v), ∀x. Letting p → 0
leads to
S(cu+ (1− c)v, v) ≤ S(x, v), ∀u < v, ∀x. (57)
Letting x = v in (57), we obtain
S(cu+ (1− c)v, v) ≤ S(v, v), ∀u < v. (58)
By (56), S(v, v) ≤ S(cu+(1−c)v, v), ∀u < v, which in combination with (58) implies
S(v, v) = S(cu+ (1− c)v, v), ∀u < v; however, by (56), S(v, v) = S(cu+ (1− c)v, v)
implies v ≤ cu+ (1− c)v, which contradicts to u < v. Hence, ρ is not elicitable.
Second, we will show that for c = 0, ρ = cVaR0+(1− c)VaR1 = VaR1 is elicitable
with respect to P. Let a > 0 be a constant and define the forecasting objective
function
S(x, y) =
{
0, if x ≥ y,
a, else.
Then for any F ∈ P and any x ≥ ρ(F ),∫
R
S(x, y)dF (y) =
∫
y≤ρ(F )
S(x, y)dF (y) = 0.
On the other hand, for any F ∈ P and any x < ρ(F ),∫
R
S(x, y)dF (y) =
∫
x<y≤ρ(F )
S(x, y)dF (y) = a
∫
x<y≤ρ(F )
dF (y) = a(1− F (x)) > 0.
Therefore, for any F ∈ P, ρ(F ) = min{x | x ∈ argminx
∫
S(x, y)dF (y)}.
Third, we will show that for any α ∈ (0, 1), VaRα is elicitable with respect to P.
Let g(·) be a strictly increasing function defined on R. Define
S(x, y) = (1{x≥y} − α)(g(x)− g(y)). (59)
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and define P = {FX | E|g(X)| <∞}.
18 It follows from Theorem 9 in Gneiting (2011)
that
[q−α (F ), q
+
α (F )] = argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF (y),
where q−α (F ) := inf{y | F (y) ≥ α} and q
+
α (F ) := inf{y | F (y) > α}. Therefore,
VaRα(F ) = q
−
α (F ) satisfies (6) with S defined in (59).
Fourth, we will show that ρ defined in (24) is not elicitable with respect to P.
Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that ρ is elicitable. Fix any a > 0 and denote
I := (−a, a). Let PI be the set of probability measures that have strictly positive
probability density on the interval I and whose support is I. Then since PI ⊂ P and
ρ is elicitable with respect to P, ρ is also elicitable with respect to PI . Therefore,
there exists a forecasting objective function S(x, y) such that
ρ(F ) = min{x | x ∈ argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF (y)}, ∀F ∈ PI .
For any F ∈ PI , the equation F (x) = α has a unique solution qα(F ) and q−α (F ) =
qα(F ) = q
+
α (F ). Hence, ρ(F ) = qα(F ), ∀F ∈ PI . Therefore, we have
qα(F ) ∈ argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF (y), ∀F ∈ PI .
Then, it follows from the proposition in Thomson (1979, p. 372) that19 there exist
18For example, if g(x) := x, then P = {FX | X ∈ L1(Ω,F , P )}; if g(x) := x
1
2n+1 (n ≥ 1), then P
includes heavy tailed distributions with infinite mean such as Cauchy distribution.
19Thomson (1979) obtains the proposition for the case when the interval I = (−∞,∞); in our
case, I = (−a, a). It can be verified that the proof of the proposition in Thomson (1979) can be
easily adapted to the case of I = (−a, a). The details are available from the authors upon request.
To make the paper self-contained, the Proposition of Thomson (1979, p. 372) is quoted here: A
necessary and sufficient condition for a scheme H to elicit x∗, solution of “F (x) = r”, as best answer
is that H satisfies:
H(x, y) =
{
A1(x) +B1(y) a.e. if y ≤ x
A2(x) +B2(y) a.e. if y > x
(60)
with
(A1(x1)−A1(x2))r + (A2(x1)−A2(x2))(1 − r) = 0, ∀x1, x2, (61)
and
B2(·)−B1(·) is non-increasing a.e. (62)
B2(·)−B1(·) +A2(·)−A1(·) = 0 a.e. (63)
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measurable functions A1, A2, B1, and B2 such that
S(x, y) =
{
A1(x) +B1(y) a.e. if y ≤ x,
A2(x) +B2(y) a.e. if y > x,
(64)
and
(A1(x1)−A1(x2))α+ (A2(x1)− A2(x2))(1− α) = 0, ∀x1, x2 ∈ I. (65)
Choose a distribution F0 ∈ P such that q
−
α (F0) < q
+
α (F0), F0 has a density f0 that
satisfies f0(x) = 0 for x ∈ (q−α (F0), q
+
α (F0)), and F0(q
−
α (F0)) = F0(q
+
α (F0)) = α. Then,
it follows from (64) that for any x ∈ [q−α (F0), q
+
α (F0)],∫
S(x, y)dF0(y) =
∫
y≤x
S(x, y)f0(y)dy +
∫
y>x
S(x, y)f0(y)dy
=
∫
y≤x
(A1(x) +B1(y))f0(y)dy +
∫
y>x
(A2(x) +B2(y))f0(y)dy
= A1(x)
∫
y≤x
f0(y)dy +
∫
y≤x
B1(y)f0(y)dy + A2(x)
∫
y>x
f0(y)dy +
∫
y>x
B2(y)f0(y)dy
= A1(x)α +
∫
y≤x
B1(y)f0(y)dy + A2(x)(1− α) +
∫
y>x
B2(y)f0(y)dy. (66)
Since f0(x) = 0 for x ∈ (q
−
α (F0), q
+
α (F0)), it follows that∫
y≤x1
B1(y)f0(y)dy =
∫
y≤x2
B1(y)f0(y)dy, ∀x1, x2 ∈ [q
−
α (F0), q
+
α (F0)], (67)∫
y>x1
B2(y)f0(y)dy =
∫
y>x2
B2(y)f0(y)dy, ∀x1, x2 ∈ [q
−
α (F0), q
+
α (F0)]. (68)
Since c ∈ [0, 1), ρ(F0) = cq−α (F0) + (1 − c)q
+
α (F0) ∈ (q
−
α (F0), q
+
α (F0)]. It then follows
from (65), (66), (67), and (68) that for any x ∈ [q−α (F0), q
+
α (F0)],∫
S(x, y)dF0(y)−
∫
S(ρ(F0), y)dF0(y)
= (A1(x)− A1(ρ(F0)))α + (A2(x)− A2(ρ(F0)))(1− α) = 0,
which in combination with ρ(F0) ∈ argminx
∫
S(x, y)dF0(y) implies that
[q−α (F0), q
+
α (F0)] ⊂ argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF0(y).
Therefore,
ρ(F0) = min{x | x ∈ argmin
x
∫
S(x, y)dF0(y)} ≤ q
−
α (F0),
which contradicts to ρ(F0) > q
−
α (F0). Hence, ρ defined in (24) is not elicitable.
Fifth, it follows from Theorem 7 in Gneiting (2011) that ρ(F ) :=
∫
xdF (x) is
elicitable with respect to P. The proof is thus completed.
44
References
Acerbi (2002). Spectral measures of risk: A coherent representation of subjective risk
aversion, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7): 1505–1518.
Acerbi, C. and Sze´kely, B. (2014). Back-testing expected shortfall, Risk Magazine
pp. 76–81.
Adrian, T. and Shin, H. S. (2014). Procyclical leverage and Value-at-Risk, Review of
Financial Studies 27(2): 373–403.
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.-M. and Heath, D. (1999). Coherent measures of
risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3): 203–228.
Aumann, R. J. and Serrano, R. (2008). An economic index of riskiness, Journal of
Political Economy 116(5): 810–836.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996). Amendment to the capital accord
to incorporate market risks, Document, Bank for International Settlements, Basel,
Switzerland.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). International convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards: A revised framework, Document, Bank for
International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). Revisions to the Basel II market
risk framework, Document, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). Fundamental review of the trading
book: A revised market risk framework, Consultative Document, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
Bellini, F. and Bignozzi, V. (2013). Elicitable risk measures, Preprint, Universita` di
Milano-Bicocca and ETH Zurich.
Berkowitz, J. (2001). Testing density forecasts, applications to risk management,
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 19: 465–474.
Berkowitz, J., Christoffersen, P. and Pelletier, D. (2011). Evaluating Value-at-Risk
models with desk-level data, Management Science 57: 2213–2227.
45
Brunnermeier, M. K., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C., Persaud, A. D. and Shin, H. S.
(2009). The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: 11th Geneva Report
on the World Economy, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market liquidity and funding
liquidity, Review of Financial Studies 22(6): 2201–2238.
Campbell, S. D. (2006). A review of backtesting and backtesting procedures, Journal
of Risk 9: 1–17.
Cherny, A. and Madan, D. (2009). New measures for performance evaluation, Review
of Financial Studies 22(7): 2571–2606.
Christoffersen, P. (1998). Evaluating interval forecasts, International Economic Re-
view 39: 841–862.
Christoffersen, P. (2010). Backtesting, in R. Cont (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quantitative
Finance, Wiley.
Christoffersen, P. F. and Pelletier, D. (2004). Backtesting Value-at-Risk: a duration-
based approach, Journal of Financial Econometrics 2: 84–108.
Cont, R., Deguest, R. and Scandolo, G. (2010). Robustness and sensitivity analysis
of risk measurement procedures, Quantitative Finance 10(6): 593–606.
Costanzino, N. and Curran, M. (2015). Backtesting general spectral risk measures
with application to expected shortfall, Preprint, University of Toronto and Bank
of Montreal.
Dan´ıelsson, J., Jorgensen, B. N., Samorodnitsky, G., Sarma, M. and de Vries, C. G.
(2013). Fat tails, VaR and subadditivity, Journal of Econometrics 172(2): 283–291.
Davis, M. H. A. (2013). Consistency of risk measure estimates, Preprint, Imperial
College London.
Denneberg, D. (1994). Non-Additive Measure and Integral, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Boston.
Dhaene, J., Vanduffel, S., Goovaerts, M. J., Kaas, R., Tang, Q. and Vyncke, D. (2006).
Risk measures and comonotonicity: A review, Stochastic Models 22(4): 573–606.
46
Duffie, D. and Pan, J. (1997). An overview of Value at Risk, Journal of Derivatives
4(3): 7–49. Reprinted in Options Markets, edited by G. Constantinides and A. G.
Malliaris, London: Edward Elgar, 2001.
Duffie, D. and Pan, J. (2001). Analytical Value-at-Risk with jumps and credit risk,
Finance and Stochastics 5(2): 115–180.
Embrechts, P., Wang, B. and Wang, R. (2014). Aggregation-robustness and model
uncertainty of regulatory risk measures, Preprint, ETH Zurich.
Engelberg, J., Manski, C. F. and Williams, J. (2009). Comparing the point predic-
tions and subjective probability distributions of professional forecasters, Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 27(1): 30–41.
Engle, R. F. and Manganelli, S. (2004). CAViaR: conditional autoregressive Value-at-
Risk by regression quantiles, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 22: 367–
381.
Fama, E. F. and Miller, M. H. (1972). The Theory of Finance, Dryden Press.
Fissler, T. and Ziegel, J. F. (2015). Higher order elicitability and Osband’s principle,
Preprint, University of Bern.
Fissler, T., Ziegel, J. F. and Gneiting, T. (2015). Expected shortfall is jointly elicitable
with Value at Risk - implications for backtesting, Preprint, University of Bern,
Heidelerg Institute for Theoretical Studies, and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
Fo¨llmer, H. and Schied, A. (2002). Convex measures of risk and trading constraints,
Finance and Stochastics 6(4): 429–447.
Foster, D. P. and Hart, S. (2009). An operational measure of riskiness, Journal of
Political Economy 117(5): 785–814.
Foster, D. P. and Hart, S. (2013). A wealth-requirement axiomatization of riskiness,
Theoretical Economics 8(2): 591–620.
Frittelli, M. and Gianin, E. R. (2002). Putting order in risk measures, Journal of
Banking & Finance 26(7): 1473–1486.
47
Frittelli, M. and Gianin, E. R. (2005). Law invariant convex risk measures, Advances
in Mathematical Economics 7: 33–46.
Gaglianone, W. P., Lima, L. R., Linton, O. and Smith, D. R. (2011). Evaluat-
ing Value-at-Risk models via quantile regression, Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 29(1): 150–160.
Garcia, R., Renault, E´. and Tsafack, G. (2007). Proper conditioning for coherent
VaR in portfolio management, Management Science 53(3): 483–494.
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 18(2): 141–153.
Glasserman, P. and Kang, W. (2013). Design of risk weights, Operations Research,
forthcoming.
Glasserman, P. and Xu, X. (2014). Robust risk measurement and model risk, Quan-
titative Finance 14(1): 29–58.
Gneiting, T. (2011). Making and evaluating point forecasts, Journal of the American
Statistical Association 106(494): 746–762.
Gordy, M. B. (2003). A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital
rules, Journal of Financial Intermediation 12(3): 199–232.
Gordy, M. B. and Howells, B. (2006). Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the dis-
ease without killing the patient?, Journal of Financial Intermediation 15(3): 395–
417.
Haas, M. (2005). Improved duration-based backtesting of Value-at-Risk, Journal of
Risk 8: 17–38.
Hansen, L. P. (2013). Challenges in identifying and measuring systemic risk, in
M. Brunnermeier and A. Krishnamurthy (eds), Risk Topography: Systemic Risk
and Macro Modeling, University of Chicago Press, chapter 1.
Hansen, L. P. and Sargent, T. J. (2001). Robust control and model uncertainty,
American Economic Review 91(2): 60–66.
Hansen, L. P. and Sargent, T. J. (2007). Robustness, Princeton Unviersity Press.
48
Hart, S. (2011). Comparing risks by acceptance and rejection, Journal of Political
Economy 119(4): 617–638.
Huber, P. J. (1981). Robust Statistics, 2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ.
Huber, P. J. and Ronchetti, E. M. (2009). Robust Statistics, 2nd edn, John Wiley &
Sons, Hoboken, NJ.
Ibragimov, R. (2009). Portfolio diversification and value at risk under thick-tailedness,
Quantitative Finance 9(5): 565–580.
Ibragimov, R. and Walden, J. (2007). The limits of diversification when losses may
be large, Journal of Banking & Finance 31(8): 2551–2569.
Jorion, P. (2007). Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk,
3 edn, McGraw-Hill, Boston.
Keppo, J., Kofman, L. and Meng, X. (2010). Unintended consequences of the market
risk requirement in banking regulation, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
34(10): 2192 – 2214.
Kerkhof, J. and Melenberg, B. (2004). Backtesting for risk-based regulatory capital,
Journal of Banking & Finance 28: 1845–1865.
Kou, S., Peng, X. and Heyde, C. C. (2006). What is a good risk measure: Bridging the
gaps between data, coherent risk measures, and insurance risk measures, Preprint,
Columbia University.
Kou, S., Peng, X. and Heyde, C. C. (2013). External risk measures and Basel accords,
Mathematics of Operations Research 38(3): 393–417.
Kupiec, P. (1995). Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk management models,
Journal of Derivatives 3: 73–84.
Lai, T. L., Shen, D. and Gross, S. (2011). Evaluating probability forecasts, Annals
of Statistics 39(5): 2356–2382.
Lambert, N. S., Pennock, D. M. and Shoham, Y. (2008). Eliciting properties of
probability distributions, Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, EC ’08, ACM, New York, NY, USA, pp. 129–138.
49
Linton, O. and Xiao, Z. (2013). Estimation of and inference about the expected
shortfall for time series with infinite variance, Econometric Theory 29(4): 771–807.
Lopez, J. A. (1999a). Methods for evaluating Value-at-Risk estimates, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 2: 3–17.
Lopez, J. A. (1999b). Regulatory evaluation of Value-at-Risk models, Journal of Risk
1: 37–64.
Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M. and Rustichini, A. (2006). Ambiguity aversion, robust-
ness, and the variational representation of preferences, Econometrica 74(6): 1447–
1498.
McNeil, A. and Frey, R. (2000). Estimation of tail-related risk measures for het-
eroskedastic financial time series: an extreme value approach, Journal of Empirical
Finance 7: 271–300.
McNeil, A. J., Frey, R. and Embrechts, P. (2005). Quantitative Risk Management:
Concepts, Techiniques, Tools, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Moscadelli, M. (2004). The modelling of operational risk: experience with the analysis
of the data collected by the basel committee, Preprint 517, Banca d’Italia.
Osband, K. H. (1985). Providing Incentives for Better Cost Forecasting, PhD thesis,
University of California at Berkeley.
Rockafellar, R. T. and Uryasev, S. (2002). Conditional Value-at-Risk for general loss
distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7): 1443–1471.
Savage, L. J. (1971). Elicitation of personal probabilities and expectations, Journal
of the American Statistical Association 66(336): 783–810.
Schmeidler, D. (1986). Integral representation without additivity, Proceedings of the
American Mathematical Society 97(2): 255–261.
Schmeidler, D. (1989). Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity,
Econometrica 57(3): 571–587.
Shi, Z. and Werker, B. J. M. (2012). Short-horizon regulation for long-term investors,
Journal of Banking & Finance 36(12): 3227 – 3238.
50
So, M. K. P. and Wong, C.-M. (2012). Estimation of multiple period expected shortfall
and median shortfall for risk management, Quantitative Finance 12(5): 739–754.
Song, Y. and Yan, J.-A. (2006). The representation of two types of functionals on
L∞(Ω,F) and L∞(Ω,F ,P), Science in China Series A: Mathematics 49(10): 1376–
1382.
Song, Y. and Yan, J.-A. (2009). Risk measures with comonotonic subadditivity or
convexity and respecting stochastic orders, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
45(3): 459–465.
Tasche, D. (2002). Expected shortfall and beyond, Journal of Banking & Finance
26(7): 1519–1533.
Thomson, W. (1979). Eliciting production possibilities from a well-informed manager,
Journal of Economic Theory 20(3): 360–380.
Von Hippel, P. T. (2005). Mean, median, and skew: Correcting a textbook rule,
Journal of Statistical Education 13(2).
Wang, S. S., Young, V. R. and Panjer, H. H. (1997). Axiomatic characterization of
insurance prices, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 21(2): 173–183.
Weber, S. (2006). Distribution-invariant risk measures, information, and dynamic
consistency, Mathematical Finance 16(2): 419–442.
Wen, Z., Peng, X., Liu, X., Bai, X. and Sun, X. (2013). Asset allocation under the
Basel Accord risk measures, Preprint, Peking University.
Winkler, R. L. and Jose, V. R. R. (2011). Scoring rules, in C. J. (ed.), Wiley En-
cyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 7, John Wiley &
Sons, New York, pp. 4733–4744.
Xi, J., Coleman, T. F. and Li, Y. (2013). A gradual non-convexification method for
minimizing VaR, Journal of Risk, forthcoming.
Xia, J. (2013). Comonotonic convex preferences, Preprint, Academy of Mathematics
and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Ziegel, J. F. (2013). Coherence and elicitability, Mathematical Finance, forthcoming.
51
